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Executive Summary
This document reports on a workshop on synthetic biology 
and biosecurity held at King’s College London on 28 February 
2014.
Synthetic biology’s aim to make biology easier to engineer has  
raised concerns that it could ‘deskill’ biology and increase the 
risk of misuse for biowarfare or bioterrorism. The workshop 
brought together synthetic biologists, policy experts, science 
journalists and social scientists to explore whether concerns 
about these risks are realistic or exaggerated in the light of 
current scientific realities.
The first part of this report summarises the discussions that 
occurred, replicating as accurately as possible what was said 
by the workshop participants, without commenting on those 
statements. In the second part the authors use their social 
science expertise to analyse those discussions and the key 
findings are summarised here. 
The synthetic biology/engineering conundrum
The failures encountered by former bioweapons programmes 
were used to demonstrate that there are tangible and 
intangible barriers to the misuse and reproducibility of science. 
Tacit knowledge and socio-technical factors limit the possibility 
of reproducing experiments based on the informational 
aspects of science alone. It was argued that a more in-depth 
analysis of these socio-technical dimensions would lead to 
more refined assessments of the biosecurity threats posed by 
synthetic biology. It was, however, argued by some 
participants that because synthetic biology is an engineering 
discipline, these tangible and intangible barriers would in future 
become irrelevant. This position was challenged from two 
perspectives:
Firstly, there were discussions about the extent to which 
synthetic biology has achieved, or ever will achieve, the goal of 
transforming biology into an engineering discipline. The 
consensus was that it had not yet, but for some of the 
participants it was only a question of time before it did. This 
meant that it was important to focus on trends rather than 
absolutes, because even if synthetic biology does not make 
the engineering of biology easy, it will probably make it easier. 
Secondly, there were discussions about the extent to which an 
engineering approach would eliminate the need for the kinds 
of tacit knowledge and other socio-technical factors that had 
impeded the development of large state-sponsored 
bioweapons programmes in the past. During these 
discussions, the more extreme depiction of synthetic biology 
as an engineering discipline tended to become tempered, and 
it was pointed out that skills and large infrastructures remained 
important in other (non-biological) fields of engineering.
This revealed an interesting tension. On the one hand, if tacit 
knowledge remains important in synthetic biology, then this 
implies that it will not be easily accessible to outsiders and this 
reduces concerns about the dual use threat. On the other 
hand, if synthetic biology is an engineering discipline and if this  
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means that we overcome the barriers posed by tacit 
knowledge, then this implies that it could become more 
accessible to outsiders and this increases the dual use threat. 
Thus, biosecurity concerns are heightened when the more 
extreme depiction of synthetic biology’s ability to engineer 
biology is emphasised. We characterise this as the ‘synthetic 
biology/engineering conundrum’.
What do we mean by ‘de-skilling’?
This conundrum arises because the ‘de-skilling’ of biology is 
often misrepresented as meaning that any layperson, working 
outside professional scientific institutions, is or soon will be 
able to design and produce organisms that behave predictably 
and reliably. However, a different understanding of ‘de-skilling’, 
and of the engineering approach of synthetic biology, emerged 
during the workshop discussions. In this understanding, 
dependence on the craft skills of a small number of highly 
trained individuals is reduced for some parts of the production 
process, usually by standardisation and mechanisation. This 
does not mean that skills become irrelevant or that all aspects 
of the work become easier. Specialised teams, expertise, 
complicated machinery, advanced technology, trouble 
shooting - and thus organisational factors - continue to be 
required when a design and engineering approach develops.
If we are to disentangle synthetic biology and biosecurity 
concerns, and to have a more refined assessment of 
biosecurity threats (how scared should we be?) we believe 
that it is necessary to have more nuanced discussions about 
the extent to which synthetic biology is, or ever will be, an 
engineering discipline; and whether, in practice, this would 
reduce the importance of tacit knowledge, specialist expertise 
of different kinds, collective work, large infrastructures, and 
organisational factors. Such discussions would need to 
identify those aspects of the work that would become easier – 
in the sense that they can, for example, be automated and 
reliably performed by a robot - and those which are likely to 
remain difficult, in the sense that they still require craft skills to 
be successfully achieved. This would need to take into 
account not only the material and informational aspects of the 
field, but also other important socio-technical dimensions that 
will shape the development of the field.
Blaming the media
Some synthetic biologists and some policy makers argued 
strongly that the way in which the media reported science was  
a major obstacle for rational debate. However, for good or ill, 
the primary role of the media is not to communicate science 
calmly and rationally. It is an industry that, just like any other, 
seeks to make money and in many cases this is best achieved 
by entertaining their audiences. In addition, it is entirely 
legitimate for debates among scientists about the purposes 
and findings of research to be represented, so that citizens are 
more able to understand and participate in such debates and 
to have their say about future directions. It is also interesting to 
note that scientists often perceive dramatic scare stories 
about science as damaging, but that dramatic – and often 
equally overstated - stories of scientific breakthroughs, which 
are the mirror image of such scares, are usually welcomed as 
generating support for science. Scientists also often assume 
that lay members of the public are easily swayed by negative 
accounts of science, and that the tenor of media reports will 
determine whether ‘the public’ will be ‘for’ or ‘against’ a 
particular technology. This set of beliefs about science and the 
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media, and about public understanding of science is, however, 
challenged by social science research that demonstrates that 
members of the public are not passive recipients of media 
messages and that they can hold nuanced views on scientific 
and technological developments.
‘Hype’ as a double-edged sword
Discussions at the workshop demonstrated how different 
communities stress particular issues in particular contexts, and 
how this plays an important role to construct and maintain 
resources and support for each of these communities. Thus, 
scientists who promote synthetic biology need to portray an 
optimistic vision of the potential of the engineering approach 
to biology as part of their endeavours to develop support for a 
new field of research which they believe has great significance 
and potential. Some of those in the security field, including 
some policy makers, social scientists and natural scientists 
often exaggerate the ‘dual use threat’ in order to attract 
resources to their own work. Researchers who conduct social 
studies of science and technology often seek to emphasise 
the complexity of real world situations, and the importance of 
social dimensions of science, in order to justify the need for 
their expertise. Unfortunately, this can sometimes have 
unintended consequences that are detrimental to their own 
interests and/or to the nature of public debate. We argue that 
a better understanding and acknowledgement of these 
dynamics would help towards developing more productive 
discussions in which the different communities involved could 
move beyond simply defending their own positions.
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Introduction
This document reports on a workshop titled ‘Synthetic Biology 
and Biosecurity’ held at King’s College London on 28 February 
2014, and organised by Catherine Jefferson, Filippa Lentzos 
and Claire Marris of the Department of Social Science, Health 
and Medicine.
The aim of the workshop was to explore the extent to which 
concerns about the misuse of synthetic biology for biological 
warfare or bioterrorism are realistic or exaggerated in the light 
of the realities of scientific research in this area. The workshop 
brought together a group of synthetic biologists, policy 
experts, science journalists and social scientists with specialist 
expertise in these areas. A Scoping Report was prepared and 
circulated to all participants in advance of the workshop in 
order to frame the discussions. This document (reproduced in 
Appendix 1) identified five recurring ‘myths’ about the dual use 
threat of synthetic biology that dominate discussions in policy 
arenas and the media, and highlighted some key challenges to 
this narrative.
The meeting was held under the Chatham House Rule in order 
to facilitate open and productive discussion:
When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham 
House Rule, participants are free to use the information 
received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the 
speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed. 
The speakers at the workshop have given their consent for 
their names to be used in the summary of their talks and 
related citations. 
The workshop was organised around four sessions that 
focused on different aspects of synthetic biology and 
biosecurity, each introduced by two short presentations with 
ample time allocated for interactive discussion among all the 
participants:
Session 1: How have concerns about 
biological weapons and bioterrorism emerged 
and evolved over time?
Session 2: How have ‘dual use’ concerns 
about synthetic biology been framed in the 
media and in policy discourse?
Session 3: What are the tangible and 
intangible barriers to state and non-state 
production of biological weapons?
Session 4: What scientific developments within 
synthetic biology might be relevant to misuse 
concerns, now or in future?
Jefferson, Lentzos & Marris
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The first part of this report summarises presentations made by 
eight experts in the field and the discussions that occurred,  
replicating as accurately as possible what was said by the 
workshop participants, without commenting on those 
statements, and without endorsing (or not) any of the views 
expressed. Arguments are reported even when they were only 
expressed by one or a few participants. The aim is to 
represent the diversity of views expressed, and we do not 
seek to assign particular weight to any of the arguments 
reported. The aim was not to reach consensus or to develop 
any recommendations. In the second part of the document, 
we take a step back and use our social science expertise to 
identify key themes that emerged from the discussions, and to 
reflect on the dynamics of those discussions. We tease out 
some of the key arguments that participants made throughout 
the day and how they related to each other and to social 
science scholarship in these areas.
The slides used for the presentations are available from the 
SSHM website: http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sshm.
A Twitter hashtag (#synbiosec) was created for this workshop. 
You can view comments made by participants and others 
there, and we encourage readers to use this hashtag to post 
further comments about this report.
Jefferson, Lentzos & Marris
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Summary of Discussions
Session 1: How have concerns about biological weapons and bioterrorism emerged and evolved 
over time?
Jefferson, Lentzos & Marris
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‘The world’s most deadly weapons’: 
The politics of bioterrorism
Presentation by Filippa Lentzos
SSHM, King’s College London
This presentation explored the question of how concerns 
about bioterrorism have emerged and evolved. It provided a 
brief background to the history of biological weapons and the 
multilateral treaties banning their use, development, 
production and stockpiling. It noted that in the last years of 
the Cold War, US security analysts began to project a new 
set of threats posed by rising third-world states and terrorists 
supported by those states. As the Cold War faded, terrorists 
with weapons of mass destruction began to replace the 
Soviet threat and this became the driving force behind US 
preparedness and biodefense programmes in the 1990s.
The talk highlighted how early political debates contained 
different assessments of the importance, urgency and scale 
of the bioterrorism threat. ‘Alarmists’ emphasised the 
vulnerability of civilian populations and the possibility of 
apocalyptic attacks with natural or genetically engineered 
pathogens; ‘sceptics’ emphasised the identities of 
‘bioterrorists’ and their historical lack of interests in and 
capacities to pursue such attacks. Ultimately, alarmism 
triumphed and federal funds poured into major new civilian 
biodefense programmes in the late 1990s.
Following 9/11 and the ‘anthrax letters’ attacks, the focus on 
bioterrorism became central to national security concerns in 
the US. It was argued that ‘Amerithrax’ powerfully illustrated 
how biology could be used to terrorise and kill, and 
highlighted the lack of means available to detect and 
mitigate, much less prevent, such an attack. It noted that 
while political debates in the 1990s were vague about who 
the potential bioweapons users might be, the Bush 
administration post-9/11 was very explicit about its ‘enemy’: 
Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda, Iraq, North Korea, Iran, 
Libya, Syria and Sudan.
The presentation went on to explore how this perception of 
threat drastically expanded the biodefense infrastructure, 
multiplying the number of laboratories, projects and people 
working on dangerous pathogens. One estimate is that more 
than $70 billion have been spent on civilian biodefense since 
2001.
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It was argued that the initial framing of bioterrorism, 
conceived and pushed by Washington as high consequence 
‘superterrorism’, was spread in the first decade of the 
century to international security forums and back to capitals 
around the world. Within a decade, many states had not only 
commonly accepted the threat, but obligations under UN 
Security Council Resolution 1540 and the Biological 
Weapons Convention ensured that the threat of bioterror as a 
security concern became codified in national legislation and 
that states committed themselves to implementing measures 
to counter it.
The presentation concluded by arguing 
that more recently, however, security 
concerns about bioterrorism have become 
increasingly linked with health concerns. 
Bioterrorism, or the deliberate spread of 
disease, is no longer thought of as a 
stand-alone threat, but has instead come 
to be understood as one element of a 
spectrum of disease outbreak threats that 
also encompass natural outbreaks, 
unintended consequences, accidental 
releases, negligence, and sabotage. This 
‘spectrum approach’ where bioterrorism is  
framed as a ‘catastrophic health event’ is 
starting to manifest itself in national policies, and is opening 
up alternate responses and intervention strategies to keep us 
secure from the threat of disease.
“The initial framing of bioterrorism, 
conceived and pushed by 
Washington as high consequence 
‘superterrorism’, was spread in the 
first decade of the 21st Century to 
international security forums and 
back to capitals around the world.” 
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Figure 1: Following 9/11 and the ‘anthrax letters’ attaks, the focus on bioterrorism became central to 
national security concerns in the US - and this was also when synthetic biology first emerged.
Credit: istockphoto (left image) and the FBI, Famous Cases & Criminals, Amerithrax Case
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/anthrax-amerithrax/the-envelopes
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The Transmissible H5N1 Saga: Where 
do we go from here?
Presentation by Debora MacKenzie
Reporter, New Scientist
This presentation went through the different arguments that 
arose during the dispute about whether or not the research 
conducted by Ron Fouchier on the bird flu virus H5N1 should 
be published. It was noted that in scientific journalism, stories 
are rarely eyewitness accounts so journalists must rely on 
sources. This means that, while they try to report what is 
true, in fact they can only report what people tell them is true. 
H5N1 does not spread easily from human to human, but it 
kills more than fifty per cent of people infected. The Fouchier 
experiment sought to investigate whether H5N1 could 
become readily transmissible between mammals and still 
remain highly virulent. A virus as contagious as ordinary flu, 
that would kill half its cases, is a terrifying thought. Some 
virologists had been concerned that this could happen and 
were worried that governments were not taking the threat 
seriously enough. The Fouchier experiment passed H5N1 
among ferrets as an animal model and discovered that a 
mutated H5N1 virus that was air transmissible could emerge. 
Moreover, Fouchier initially stated that the virus had not lost 
any of its pathogenicity.
The researchers were taken by surprise when it was 
suggested that their findings should perhaps not be 
published. At first the discussion focused on finding ways to 
limit access to people who need that knowledge, while 
restricting access to those who might misuse it. But a WHO 
meeting in 2012 concluded that there was no easy way to 
achieve this. Scientists, however, argued that the known 
threat of a potential pandemic should override an unknown 
biosecurity threat, and that conducting and publishing 
scientific research was the only way to defend against it. 
Moreover, because the WHO brought non-Americans to the 
table, this allowed different sensitivities to emerge. In 
particular, Indonesians were unhappy that they might not be 
given access to research results based on experiments that 
had used a virus obtained in their country.
Public debates focused on biosecurity: it was feared that 
publication of the research would provide a recipe that 
putative terrorists could use to make a highly dangerous 
virus. In private, however, biosafety concerns were the real 
worry: the fear was that the mutated virus might escape from 
the lab. Concerns were not expressed specifically about 
Fouchier’s lab, which is presumed to adhere to high biosafety 
standards, but about other researchers who might try to 
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The presentation argued that, in order to improve biosafety, 
we need to establish internationally-agreed mechanisms to 
regulate ‘gain of function’ (GOF) research. This would involve 
three things. Firstly, there should be a wider conversation 
about how limiting publication can sometimes 
make GOF research safer. For example, it was 
noted that in the case of the recent discovery of 
a new type of botulinum toxin, restrictions on the 
publication of the genetic sequence until an 
antidote was developed made sense. Secondly, 
there is a need to revise the vetting procedures 
for laboratory biosafety that were set after 
Asilomar in 1974. Thirdly, consultation to decide 
which GOF experiments are worth conducting 
should take place before the research is done, 
based on a thorough risk-benefit analysis; the 
publication stage is too late. Wider scrutiny of 
this kind could create peer pressure and a new norm for 
occasionally limiting scientific freedom in the interest of safety. 
Unfortunately, the way in which the dispute around the 
publication of the Fouchier experiment unfolded has made 
that kind of consultation and openness less likely.
The presentation concluded by suggesting that the H5N1 
saga was characterised by an unprecedented amount of spin 
from the scientists involved. The scientists initially portrayed 
the virus as very dangerous, and this was therefore how 
journalists reported the story. Fouchier initially said that all the 
ferrets had died, and that the virus was as transmissible as 
seasonal flu. But when the scientists realised that they might 
not be allowed to publish their work, the story changed and 
they suggested that the virus was not terribly lethal or 
contagious, and that the whole thing had been invented by 
sensationalist journalists. They key issue here is not that 
scientists spin, but that the scientists felt that they had to do 
this in order to keep doing work that they truly believed was 
needed to protect public health. This tends to lead to pre-
emptive self-justification on the part of scientists rather than 
opening up genuine discussion about substantive concerns. 
This is not helpful and does not encourage the transparency 
we need to keep GOF work safe.
“A virus as contagious as ordinary 
flu, that would kill half its cases, is a 
terrifying thought. Some virologists 
were worried that governments 
were not taking the threat seriously 
enough.” 
Discussion in Session 1
Discussion in this session focused predominantly on 
communication of science and the role of the media.
Some participants argued that it is not scientists who ‘spin’, 
but the media who sensationalise; and that a rational 
discussion that focuses on the science is required, based on 
published scientific literature. These participants bemoaned 
the fact that journalists used attention-grabbing headlines with 
adjectives such a ‘killer flu’ or ‘deadly virus’ that will tend to 
scare people. 
However, it was noted that in the H5N1 example, some 
virologists, and notably Fouchier, did initially emphasise the 
alarming aspects of the research, precisely in order to raise 
concern, because they were genuinely scared about the threat 
and worried that nobody was doing anything to develop 
vaccines or to eradicate the virus from the poultry population. 
Thus, journalists were simply quoting what the scientists had 
said.
Some felt this demonstrated that some individual scientists - 
just like members of society in general - behaved in 
irresponsible ways, but that this did not represent the majority 
of the community: there is a spectrum and most scientists 
seek to communicate their research in responsible ways. In 
response, it was noted that, understandably, scientists talk 
differently in different contexts and/or to different audiences, 
for example when seeking research funds or speaking to 
journalists compared to when speaking with their post-docs in 
the lab, giving talks at scientific conferences or writing in the 
scientific literature. Thus, it is not always just a case of dividing 
scientists into those who act responsibly and those who do 
not. 
Discussion evolved into the larger theme of the need for 
scientists to take responsibility for the way they speak about 
their research, and it was argued that scientists need to learn 
to communicate their research carefully where it touches on 
the question of risk. For example, instead of simply 
emphasising the danger of a particular experiment they could 
have given more attention to the biosafety precautions they 
had taken and the difficulties they faced in conducting the 
research.
It was noted that the synthetic biology community has a high 
level of awareness of safety and security issues. The voluntary 
screening of orders by gene synthesis companies was given 
as an example of responsibility, although the effectiveness of 
this voluntary mechanism was contested.
Questions were raised about how the H5N1 controversy had 
affected the scientists involved, and how more openness and 
discussion could be encouraged in future. It was suggested 
that, unfortunately, the experience had made the scientists 
less likely to open up to broader consultation about their work. 
Regulations and guidelines set out since Asilomar focus on the 
biosafety risks associated with laboratory research and 
possible unintended releases of genetically modified 
organisms, but do not enable deliberation about the broader 
risks and benefits involved. Reticence to this wider kind of 
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accountability could in part be explained by the fact that the 
scientists involved genuinely believe that they are doing 
important work that contributes to public 
health. 
The need for international agreement on 
containment measures for biosafety was re-
emphasised; and it was pointed out that 
even in the UK there have been cases where 
reputable universities have been prosecuted 
by the Health and Safety Executive for failure 
to comply with safety measures established 
by the Government’s Advisory Committee on 
Genetic Modification.
A number of participants pointed out that it is 
important to emphasise the potential benefits 
of synthetic biology, as well as possible misuses. For example, 
it was noted that synthetic biologists are working to develop 
methods for rapid vaccine development to respond to new 
strains of flu, as well as biosensors that could aid in the 
detection of pathogens.
Questions were also raised about differences between the UK 
and US in the way that perceptions of the bioterrorism threat 
have emerged and evolved. 9/11 and the anthrax letters had 
an impact on security thinking in both the US and the UK. In 
the US, bioterrorism became a specific focus of concern, with 
dedicated measures put into place to detect and avert 
potential attacks and significant funding being directed to such 
measures. However, in the UK, bioterrorism has not been 
singled out in the same way, and any potential threats have 
been addressed as part of a broader resilience framework to 
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats.
Jefferson, Lentzos & Marris
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“Consultation to decide which GOF 
experiments are worth conducting 
should take place before the work is 
done, based on a thorough risk-benefit 
analysis; the publication stage is too 
late.”
Debora MacKenzie
Session 2: How have ‘dual use’ concerns about synthetic biology been framed in the media and in 
policy discourse?
Jefferson, Lentzos & Marris
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Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity in 
the Media
Presentation by Catherine Jefferson
SSHM, King’s College London
This presentation focused on the way in which mass media 
discusses the dual use issue in its coverage of synthetic 
biology, and how prevalent that narrative is. It began by 
identifying a number of ‘news values’ that characterise a 
‘good’ news story and suggested that threshold, relevance, 
co-option and negativity were particularly notable in 
examples of coverage of synthetic biology. It was noted that 
accounts of synthetic biology as a radical and revolutionary 
new field with huge potential (threshold) often coexisted with 
fears about its negative impacts and potential for misuse 
(negativity).
The presentation went on to explore the prevalence of dual 
use concerns in media reports of synthetic biology. A 
LexisNexis search for articles on synthetic biology in all major 
English language newspapers found 465 articles about 
synthetic biology, of which 116 (25%) included the terms 
‘bioweapon’ or ‘terror’, indicating that they mentioned dual 
use concerns. A smaller sample of UK broadsheet 
newspapers was also analysed and the prevalence of dual 
use concerns there was found to be around 16%. Within this 
sample, a number of key ‘alarmist anchors’ were identified – 
the 2002 polio synthesis experiment, the 2005 reconstruction 
of Spanish flu experiment, and Craig Venter’s statements 
about creating synthetic life – which served to provide 
symbolic visions of risk. It was argued that these alarmist 
anchors amplify the threat narrative of synthetic biology.
The presentation went on to suggest that the threat narrative 
in media accounts of synthetic biology and biosecurity is 
underpinned by a number of assumptions about science and 
technology in general, and synthetic biology in particular. It 
was suggested that there is a strong element of technological 
determinism in media narratives of synthetic biology, which 
presumes that, once set in motion, synthetic biology will head 
down an inevitable one-way path in which biology will be ‘de-
skilled’ and that this means that it will become accessible to 
anyone. However, it was argued that this fails to take into 
account the challenges and contingencies involved in trying 
to make biology easier to engineer, and overlooks the 
continued importance of infrastructural and socio-technical 
factors, such as tacit knowledge, that limit the extent to 
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become accessible to anyone. It was also suggested that by 
focusing so much on the technology, any analysis of the real-
world adversaries who might actually want to use this 
technology gets side-lined.
It was suggested that one of the reasons why 
uncertainties and contingencies disappear in media 
stories about science, is because there is a focus on 
future promise. It was argued that media reporting of 
science is compelled to include future visions, and 
scientists, especially synthetic biologists, are also 
increasingly under pressure to ‘big up’ the impact of 
their work. It was noted that if we start from the 
premise that synthetic biology will deliver on future 
promises of making biology easier to engineer, then the 
question becomes: what are the perils? Thus, the more hype 
there is around the future promise, the more hype there also 
is around perils.
It was noted that this ‘promise and perils’ way of framing 
synthetic biology dominates media and policy discourse. The 
presentation concluded by suggesting that the circulation of 
these alarmist anchors in the media serves to reinforce the 
same threat narratives in policy discourse.
“Out of 465 newspaper articles 
about synthetic biology in the 
English language, 116 (25%) 
mentioned the words ‘terror’ or 
‘bioweapons’.” 
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“The Promises and Perils of Synthetic Biology”
Tucker et al., The New Atlantis, 2006
“[Synthetic biology] promises great things in medicine, energy and the 
environment, but what are the perils?”
The Times, 2009
“Biology’s Brave New World: the Promises and Perils of the Synbio Revolution”
Garret, Foreign Affairs, 2014
“Synthetic Biology - Life 2.0: The new science of synthetic biology is poised between 
hype and hope” 
The Economist, 2006
 “Master the new loom before life's tapestry unravels at our hands” 
Savulescu, Times Higher Education, 2012
Figure 2: Media headlines often frame the debate in terms of ‘promises’ versus ‘perils’.
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Synthetic Biology and Dual Use 
Concerns in Policy Discourse
Presentation by James Revill
Harvard Sussex Program, University of 
Sussex
This presentation examined the way in which synthetic 
biology and dual use concerns have been addressed in the 
policy area, with a particular emphasis on States Parties to 
the BWC. It was noted that while there has been some hype 
around synthetic biology, there have also been a number of 
more nuanced statements in the context of the BWC, such 
as a statement by the Australian delegation which noted the 
theoretical possibilities but current technical challenges of 
misuse of synthetic biology. However, there have been other 
statements, such as the Chinese delegation in 2011 (cited in 
Appendix 1), that are bolder and hype the dual use threat of 
synthetic biology.
The presentation went on to explore the context of the dual 
use threat framing. It was noted that in the immediate 
aftermath of 9/11 and ‘Amerithrax’, advances in 
biotechnology and potential misuse began to be perceived as 
a broader challenge. The emergence of synthetic biology and 
perceived increases in the capacity, global nature and 
accessibility f the life sciences further fuelled concerns.
It was argued that concerns over the perceived game-
changing capacity of synthetic biology need to be 
understood in the context of a changing physical and human 
geography of synthetic biology. In addition to the wide global 
distribution of those engaged in synthetic biology research, 
synthetic biology also represents a range of disciplines 
beyond biology that includes engineering, computing, 
mathematics, etc. Furthermore, the existence of non-
professionals such as DIY biologists who operate outside of 
traditional institutional settings is also feeding into the 
concern that synthetic biology is new and novel and perhaps 
less stringently regulated and therefore could be seen as 
potentially more dangerous.
The presentation went on to argue that organisational frames 
serve as a lens for a particular way of looking at things. A 
common organisational frame is to view scientific advances 
as leading to rapid changes in biotechnology, its applications 
and its potential threats. However, it was noted that this 
framing overlooks the complexity and socially embedded 
nature of bioscience research. It was suggested that a 
fixation on worse case scenarios and minimising possible 
blame in the intelligence community, particularly following 
9/11, had compounded this framing. It was suggested that if 
these changes in the capacity, global nature and accessibility 
of the life sciences are accepted and viewed through this 
organisational frame, then the focus shifts to risk. This focus 
on risk is compounded by synthetic biology’s capacity to 
elicit ‘dread risks’ which, according to eminent social 
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psychologist Paul Slovic, are those that are characterised by 
being unfamiliar, not well understood, difficult to control and 
perceived as a harbinger of future and possibly catastrophic 
mishaps. Accidents in systems that 
are familiar and well understood will 
cause far less social disturbance, 
even if many lives are lost, than 
accidents associated with these 
‘dread’ characteristics.
The use of toxicity and infection as 
weapons has been treated with particular obloquy and it was 
noted that there exists a ‘taboo’ against biological weapons 
due to their invisible, intangible, insipid and ‘ungodly’ 
characteristics. It was suggested that synthetic biology could 
be viewed as a ‘taboo on steroids’ due to similar 
characteristics and a limited understanding of what an attack 
would look like.
It was argued that failure to react – 
and to be seen to be reacting – to 
known risks, particularly dread 
risks, would be politically 
unacceptable. It was also 
suggested that while caution is 
needed when faced with the hyperbole of synthetic biology, 
developments in the field should not be discounted: just 
because it is hyped it does not mean it should be ignored.
“Just because it is 
hyped it does not mean 
it should be ignored.”
Discussion in Session 2
Discussion in this session began by returning to complaints 
about media reporting of scientific issues. It was argued that 
dual use is not a new problem, but the context in which the 
debate arises has changed, and the way the mass media 
covers the issues is now part of the problem. The media was 
criticised for seeking controversy; focusing on shock and 
horror; maliciously, deliberately or inadvertently distorting the 
facts; oversimplifying subtle and complex issues; trivialising 
them by picking sound bites and grabbing headlines; a lack of 
proportionality; and episodic coverage, meaning that there is 
no consistent measured coverage of an issue. Instead, half-
truths and myths such as those described in the Scoping 
Report for this workshop get recycled and get a life of their 
own and become the established wisdom. Overall, media 
coverage was considered to be unscientific. Moreover, recent 
trends in the media mean that news bulletins have to be filled 
every half hour and journalists do not have the time to 
consider long-term issues. 
It was pointed out that similar things could be said about 
diplomats and politicians. When security experts have to 
explain an issue to senior civil servants or ministers, the 
information has to be very short and condensed. Thus, 
although scientific experts from the UK Government produce 
in depth well researched reports of high quality, diplomats who 
attend the BWC meetings usually do not have the time to read 
them.
Some participants pointed out, however, that 
not all media coverage of synthetic biology 
was negative and that the field had, in fact, 
managed to distance itself - so far - from 
debates about genetically modified 
organisms.
Participants from the security community 
explained that misuse scenarios and 
speculative hypotheses can serve a variety of 
functions. For example, in policy contexts they can be used to 
pose questions for the existing regulatory system in order to 
address issues before they emerge. This does not necessarily 
involve a misrepresentation of the science, but encourages 
discussion of potential long-term security challenges. In this 
sense, it was argued that it can be useful to think of the myths 
in terms of future trends rather than as absolutes. For 
example, it may be more accurate and helpful to speak of 
synthetic biology making the engineering of biology easier, 
rather than easy.
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In a policy context, misuse scenarios 
and speculative hypotheses can be 
used to pose questions for the 
existing regulatory system in order to 
address issues before they emerge.
Scientists from Imperial College London explained that, 
through their conceptual work with artists from the Interactive 
Design Department at the Royal College of Arts, an idea had 
emerged about how synthetic biology could be misused that 
they felt had serious security implications. Because the 
potential issues relate to civil liberties and forensic sciences, 
rather than terrorism or defence, they had reported this to the 
London Metropolitan Police. However, despite some initial 
discussions during which these contacts expressed their 
concern, the scientists had received little to no feedback. The 
example was used to demonstrate the frustration 
that can be experienced by scientists: they feel 
under a lot of pressure to demonstrate that they 
are acting responsibly and to consider all the 
societal aspects related to their research, but when 
an issue arose that they felt was serious, the 
agencies they contacted had not responded 
effectively.
This case study also usefully demonstrated how 
the way in which security issues are generally framed by 
organisations, in terms of defence and bioterrorism, can limit 
what is seen as a relevant concern, so that when a civil 
liberties issue is raised, it mismatches all the existing 
organisational frames and can make it difficult to know which 
organisations might be responsible. In the event, the 
workshop served to open up new channels of 
communications, since representatives from the Defence 
Science and Technology Laboratory and from the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office were present and offered to look into 
this case.
Several participants noted that there are agencies that 
scientists could contact with security concerns but that these 
networks are not evident. It was noted that in the US, 
engagement between the security and synthetic biology 
communities through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
outreach activity is much more proactive and much better 
resourced. As a result, scientists voluntarily report concerns to 
the FBI, and do not see their involvement as an affront to the 
independence of scientific research. It was argued that 
knowledge of the BWC among UK university researchers was 
low, that it was crucial to raise awareness of dual use issues 
among scientists, and that this could help foster the kind of 
transparency that Debora MacKenzie had argued for in her 
talk. It was reported that the UK is trying to establish 
something akin to the FBI outreach programme in order to 
address the issue of engagement and awareness, and that 
there may be opportunities for sharing best practice with other 
countries, many of which have even fewer resources devoted 
to biosecurity than the UK.
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Engagement between the security and 
synthetic biology communities is much 
more proactive and much better 
resourced in the US than in the UK.
Session 3: What are the tangible and intangible barriers to state and non-state production of 
biological weapons?
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Weaponization Challenges
Presentation by Sonia Ben Ouagrham-
Gormley
Department of Public and International 
Affairs, George Mason University
This presentation examined the challenges to weaponisation, 
drawing on data from interviews with former members of the 
bioweapons programmes in the US and the USSR. The 
findings from that research demonstrated that it is very 
difficult to develop biological weapons. These programmes 
had lasted many years and had been very well funded, 
however, they had not been successful in achieving their 
goals. The Soviet programme ran for 60 years, with over $20 
billion investment and approximately 15,000 personnel 
directly involved. The US programme ran over 27 years, with 
about $700 million investment and 4500 personnel involved 
at the height of the programme. Other state programmes, for 
example in Iraq and South Africa, and the well-resourced 
Aum Shinrikyo cult had also failed to produce a working 
weapon.
The Soviet programme was successful in its early stages, 
where they developed bombs and spray tanks working with 
classical agents; but their work on developing weapons 
based on new pathogens that didn’t exist in nature only 
reached the research and development stage. In addition, 
they did not succeed in producing bioweapons-specific 
ballistic or cruise missiles. The US programme was also able 
to weaponise classical agents and produce a few bombs and 
spray tanks, but none of the weapons developed met military 
requirements. One explanation for these failures is that unlike 
nuclear and chemical weapons, which use materials that are 
quite stable and have predictable behaviour, biological 
weapons rely on microorganisms that are living, can mutate, 
and are sensitive to their environment and to the way in 
which they are handled. This makes their use as a weapon 
more challenging.
Another key challenge has been the ability to ensure the 
successful passage from one stage of the development life 
cycle to the next: from research, to development, to small-
scale production, large-scale production, testing and 
weaponisation. This is not a linear process and scale-up is 
particularly challenging, because at each stage the whole 
process needs to be modified and tested before you can 
move on to larger-scale production. In addition, each stage is 
performed by different people, in different teams, and with 
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continuity of the work. Moreover, experience from the US and 
Soviet programmes demonstrated that civilian expertise in a 
specific agent (such as anthrax or smallpox) is not sufficient 
to weaponise the biological agent, and that bioweapons-
specific expertise can take more than a decade to develop.
The presentation identified endogenous and exogenous 
factors that have affected bioweapons programmes. 
Endogenous factors refer 
to organisational and 
managerial models. In a 
successful model, there is 
careful coordination and 
integration of teams and 
stages. This might involve 
functional overlap, 
whereby upstream and 
downstream teams work 
collaboratively. The main 
virtue of functional overlap 
is to allow individuals 
working at different stages  
to be aware of their 
respective technical 
constraints, and therefore 
to make decisions that 
take these constraints under consideration. In an 
unsuccessful model, there is fragmentation and 
compartmentalisation of teams and stages. This prevents the 
transfer of expertise and the identification of problems until it 
is too late or the problems become too difficult to resolve. 
Compartmentalisation and fragmentation - an organisational 
model used by most covert programmes thus far - are useful 
to evade detection, but they impede the scientific process 
and the successful transfer of knowledge from one stage to 
the next.
Exogenous factors refer to issues such as political priority 
(either lack of priority or excessive political intervention), 
economic circumstances, foreign technical assistance and 
geographical location, which can all impact on the success or 
failure of a bioweapons programme. It was pointed out that 
political priority is usually 
perceived to be positive, 
because it leads to 
funding for necessary 
resources, but too much 
involvement of political 
leaders can also create 
disruptions. In both the 
Soviet and Aum Shinrikyo 
programmes, political 
leaders became too 
closely involved in 
scientific decisions, 
preventing the 
establishment of a 
continuous and stable 
work environment 
required to make 
progress. In conclusion, experience from the Soviet 
programme demonstrates how political, economic and 
organisational factors had a severe adverse effect on 
bioweapons developments, despite a high level of expertise, 
political support and funds. In other state and terrorist 
programmes - such as Iraq's, South Africa's and Aum 
Shinrikyo's - these factors prevented the development of 
working bioweapons altogether.
“Experience from the Soviet 
programme demonstrates how 
political, economic and 
organisational factors had a 
severe adverse effect on 
bioweapons development, 
despite a high level of expertise, 
political support and funds.” 
Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley
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What is the role of tacit knowledge in 
what malevolent actors could 
achieve?
Presentation by Kathleen Vogel
Department of Science and Technology 
Studies, Cornell University
This presentation started by noting that many analyses of the 
threat posed by synthetic biology emphasise that research is 
becoming cheaper and easier and does not require the kinds 
of specialised skills and expertise that were needed for other 
kinds of biological research. The emphasis in these accounts 
tends to be on the material, informational aspects of 
synthetic biology: the fact that it is now possible to purchase 
synthesised DNA from commercial companies, and DNA 
synthesisers through the internet, and that many scientific 
journals now provide open access to articles that provide 
details on how to perform synthetic biology experiments. 
Focusing on these aspects leads to statements such as this 
one published in a recent article by Laurie Garrett in Foreign 
Affairs, suggesting that ‘[a]ll key barriers to the artificial 
synthesis of viruses and bacteria have been overcome, at 
least on proof-of-principle’. It was argued, however, that 
these analyses fail to address key questions such as: what is 
actually required to make these synthetic biology approaches 
work in practical terms? By different people? In different 
laboratories and contexts? And in particular: what is required 
for replication?
The concern is that someone could download all the 
necessary information and quite easily replicate experiments 
conducted by professional scientists. However (as discussed 
in a recent article in the New York Times), although replication 
is the gold standard of science, it is actually difficult to 
accomplish in practice. For many scientific experiments, 
replication can only be accomplished in particular 
circumstances and using highly specialised techniques and 
skill sets. The challenges involved in replication are familiar to 
scholars from Science and Technology Studies (STS), but get 
very little attention when the threat of bioweapons is 
discussed in the media or among security communities. It 
was argued that paying insufficient attention to the crucial 
issue of replication leads to erroneous assessments of the 
threat posed by these technologies; and that a new analytic 
framework (and kind of science journalism) is needed that 
takes tacit knowledge seriously in security assessments of 
synthetic biology. This would involve more in-depth analysis 
of what is shaping the development, diffusion and adoption 
of synthetic biology by different actors (including possibly 
malevolent ones).
The importance of tacit knowledge was illustrated by the 
example of the 2002 polio synthesis experiment (see Box 1 in 
Appendix 1) which is often used to demonstrate the security 
threats posed by synthetic genomics and triggered a lot of 
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concern in the US policy community and in the media when it  
was published. Concerns were based on the fact that the 
published scientific article contained explicit detail of the 
materials and methods used, and that terrorists would be 
able to purchase the necessary DNA sequences in order to 
replicate the experiment, and may even be able to modify the 
protocol to create other kinds of deadly pathogens. Closer 
analysis of the experiment, based on interviews and site visits 
with the research team involved and other polio virologists, 
had, however, revealed that there was an entire part of the 
experiment that was not talked about in the media and policy 
discussions, and yet was crucial to its success. Discussions 
focused on the ‘top part’ of the experiment, but not the 
‘bottom part’, which involved putting the synthesised RNA 
into HeLa cell extracts (see Figure 3). Being able to produce 
good quality HeLa cell extracts turns out to be a critical factor 
to successfully conduct this experiment: if you cannot do this  
you will not be able to produce any virus using this published 
protocol, regardless of how many DNA sequences you 
purchase or how closely you follow the protocol described in 
the article. And making good HeLa cell extracts is not easy, 
even though it is not a cutting edge technology and has been 
around for more than 20 years. It remains a craft-like 
technique that requires specialised and localised know-how 
that is very difficult to transfer between laboratories. Thus, 
even 12 years after publication of the article, replication of 
this experiment remains non-trivial. This demonstrates that 
some biological techniques are not necessarily becoming 
easier. It was argued that mapping out what exactly is getting 
easier, and what might remain difficult, would enable a more 
refined assessment of the biosecurity threats posed by 
synthetic biology, from both state and non-state actors, in 
order to better inform policy-making and the public about 
these threats.
The presentation concluded by arguing that STS research 
could usefully provide in-depth analyses of laboratory 
practices in different settings (university, commercial, iGEM, 
DIY), in order to elucidate the social and technical dimensions 
involved in synthetic biology that contribute to shaping (and 
limiting) biosecurity threats but tend to get glossed over in 
enthusiastic accounts of the field.
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Figure 3: Synthesis of poliovirus in the absence of natural template. From Wimmer, E. (2006). “The test-tube 
synthesis of a chemical called poliovirus”, EMBO reports 7:S3-S9.
Credit: Image reproduced with the kind permission of EMBO Reports
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potential dangers associated with this 
technology—the possible misuse of viral
synthesis in bioterrorism. The US Defense
Advanced Research Project Agency
(Arlington, VA, USA) took the same stand
and provided funding for our project, an
endeavour we considered as a wake-up
call. Indeed, the widespread attention gen-
erated by our publication raised the overall
awareness of the new reality of synthetic
viruses and its possible consequences.
Chemists have historically considered 
de novo synthesis to be the ultimate proof
for any deciphered chemical structure. If the
synthetic product, such as an antibiotic, had
the same properties as the natural isolate 
in vitro and in vivo, the structure was con-
sidered proven. For the chemist, the synthe-
sis of authentic poliovirus provides proof
that the sequence originally deciphered
from genomic RNA is correct (Cello et al,
2002; Kitamura et al, 1981; Racaniello &
Baltimore, 1981a). Although nobody really
doubted the accuracy of the poliovirus
genome sequence because it had been
determined multiple times, there are cases
in which DNA synthesis might be the only
way to ascertain that a genome sequence is
correct, as in the resurrection of the Spanish
influenza virus from archaeological samples
(Tumpey et al, 2005; see below).
The synthesis of a replicating ‘organ-ism’ in the absence of a natural tem-plate was without precedent at the
time of its publication in 2002, and pro-
voked unusual and widespread responses.
Leaving the scientific aspects aside, there
were two factors that we believe con-
tributed to the emotional, and sometimes
contradictory, reactions. The first was the
format in which the manuscript was pre-
sented to the public. During the editing
process, our paper was stripped bare of our
original discussion of the ethical and soci-
etal implications. In fact, we lost a battle
with the editors of Science and agreed to a
final text that resembled a laboratory report.
The importance of how scientific data reach
the public should not be underestimated; in
our case, the brevity led commentators to
twist the story in any desired direction—
sometimes inflammatory and of little sub-
stance—and left us, the authors, with little
defence. The second reason was the timing
of the publication. The manuscript appeared
less than a year after the terrorist attacks on
11 September 2001 and the anthrax bio-
terrorist attacks in 2001. Consequently, news
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Fig 3 | Synthesis of poliovirus in the absence of natural template. (A) Short complementary segments of
synthetic DNA (oligonucleotides) are annealed, and enzymatically extended and ligated (connected).
A full-length complementary DNA (cDNA) is assembled stepwise to represent the entire genetic
information of the poliovirus RNA genome in the form of DNA. The cDNA is then transcribed into
infectious viral RNA by a T7 RNA transcriptase. This RNA is used to seed a HeLa cell-free extract that will
replicate, just like in intact cells, to form progeny virions (Cello et al, 2002;Molla et al, 1991).
(B,C) Evidence for de novo synthesized virus is provided by plaque assays.Poliovirus plaques derived from
synthetic virus (sPV1) and wild-type virus, respectively, are formed on monolayers ofHeLa cells (Cello 
et al, 2002). Reproduced from Mueller et al (2005b), with permission.
“If you cannot produce the 
high quality HeLa cell 
extract that is needed to 
perform the bottom part 
of this experiment, you will 
not be able to make any 
virus using this published 
protocol, regardless of 
how many DNA 
sequences you purchase.” 
Kathleen Vogel
Discussion in Session 3
This session began by raising questions over what is meant by 
a ‘weapon’ in these discussions. It was noted that it is 
important to distinguish between weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), and those that aim to have less 
catastrophic impacts in terms of casualties, but can still cause 
terror. Some participants argued that for low-impact attacks, 
low-tech options were available for which tacit knowledge was  
not such an important barrier, but others argued that even for 
low-tech attacks, a terrorist would need to know how to 
handle the agent, so specialist expertise and tacit knowledge 
would remain significant. This view was supported by the fact 
that the key suspect in the relatively low-tech anthrax letters 
attack in 2001 (Bruce Ivins) was a senior biodefense 
researcher with specialist expertise in anthrax.
It was also noted that, in addition to barriers to weaponisation, 
from the perspective of state-sponsored bioweapons 
programmes, militarisation would also be crucial i.e., the 
process needed to enable military use: training, handling, 
storage and assimilation into military doctrine.
Discussion then moved on to a more conceptual argument 
about what synthetic biology is and how it might undermine 
the necessity of socio-technical factors such as tacit 
knowledge. It was argued by some synthetic biologists 
present that synthetic biology is different from molecular 
biology: it is the engineering of biology. These synthetic 
biologists recognised the description of the challenges created 
by tacit knowledge and other socio-technical 
dimensions described in the two presentations, and 
suggested that they applied equally well to their own 
labs as to the Soviet bioweapons programme. 
However, they argued these problems would be 
removed by the engineering approach of synthetic 
biology. The abstraction hierarchy, and the 
engineering tenets of modularity, characterisation and 
standardisation would enable design to occur at 
different levels while still being integrated. Engineers 
are already developing protocols for experimental work that 
are so reliable they can be described as ‘bullet-proof’ (e.g. for 
the production of competent cells), which will overcome the 
challenges of reproducibility described by Kathleen Vogel.
Some participants suggested that this discussion illustrated an 
interesting tension. On the one hand, if tacit knowledge 
remains important in synthetic biology, then this implies that it 
will not be easily accessible to outsiders and this reduces 
concerns about the dual use threat. On the other hand, if 
synthetic biology is an engineering discipline and if this means 
that we overcome the barriers posed by tacit knowledge, then 
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What do we mean by weapons? 
It is important to distinguish 
between weapons of mass 
destruction and those that have 
less catastrophic impacts.
this implies that it could become more accessible to outsiders 
and this increases the dual use threat.
Other participants pointed out that synthetic biology was 
nowhere near that level of characterisation and standardisation 
yet. For example, there are problems with the reliability of 
biological parts from the registry populated by students 
competing in iGEM. In response, it was argued that this 
registry does not represent the full potential of synthetic 
biology. For example, researchers at 
Imperial College London are 
developing standardised protocols and 
procedures and robotic high-
throughput systems to enable part 
characterisation at a professional level;  
and as the field develops it will seek to 
build biological systems that are more 
predictable, reliable and robust.
It was suggested that it would be 
useful to conduct fine-grained 
analyses to examine the extent to 
which the engineering of biology is something that is 
achievable, in order to inform assessment of the associated 
security threat. Moreover, historical studies of engineering 
practice (in non-biological sectors) demonstrate that 
troubleshooting, skills and socio-organisational factors remain 
necessary for engineered systems to function; and protocols 
are not always fully reliable.
An analogy to aeronautical engineering 
was used to illustrate that de-skilling does 
not necessarily mean that teamwork and 
large infrastructures are no longer 
necessary. Planes are built from a large 
number of well-characterised parts in a 
systematic way, but this does not mean 
that any member of the general public can 
build a plane, make it fly, and use it for commercial 
transportation. This suggests that it is too simplistic to suggest 
that if synthetic biology becomes an engineering discipline it 
will necessarily become easier for anybody to engineer a 
biological application, including dangerous ones. Thus, more 
care needs to be taken in the interpretation of statements 
about how synthetic biology will lead to ‘de-skilling’ and ‘make 
biology easier to engineer.’
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More care needs to be taken in the 
interpretation of statements about how 
synthetic biology will ‘make biology 
easier to engineer.’
Planes are built from a large number of 
well-characterised parts in a systematic 
way, but this does not mean that any 
member of the general public can build a 
plane, make it fly, and use it for 
commercial transportation.
It was noted that ideas about synthetic biology leading to the 
democratisation of biology and enabling non-professionals to 
work with biological materials and develop their own 
biotechnologies had arisen from the discourse used by 
DIY biology communities, and that in some ways they 
had been almost too successful in promoting their vision 
and enthusiasm for the field, because this had also 
raised concerns.
The session ended with the suggestion that an iGEM 
team could be run that was entirely outsourced, to 
demonstrate the power of platform technologies. It was 
argued that this was already entirely feasible, because there 
are companies that offer services for design, DNA synthesis 
and cloning.
It was also pointed out that some iGEM teams (e.g. the 2012 
Edinburgh team) have argued that failure is an integral part of 
research and have been open about sharing their negative 
results, on the basis that this can help develop the field (FAIL= 
‘Future Awesomeness Is Likely’). The suggestion here was 
that sharing negative results with the scientific community 
could perhaps help overcome some of the challenges posed 
by tacit knowledge.
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Synthetic biology is different from 
molecular biology: it is the 
engineering of biology. 
Session 4: What scientific developments within synthetic biology might be relevant to misuse 
concerns, now or in future?
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From whence the evidence?
Presentation by Piers Millet
Biological Weapons Convention 
Implementation Support Unit
The presentation began by suggesting that interest in 
synthetic biology in the context of the BWC started with a 
2006 article in the Economist (‘Synthetic Biology - Life 2.0: 
The new science of synthetic biology is poised between hype 
and hope’). There had been some prior technical discussion 
but publication of this article brought synthetic biology to a 
broader audience of Geneva diplomats. This prompted the 
BWC Implementation Support Unit (ISU) to seek ways to 
create a more balanced picture and efforts were initiated to 
build bridges between the synthetic biology and BWC 
communities.
States, scientists and the BWC ISU all play a role in 
identifying developments relevant to the BWC. The ISU has 
developed a close relationship with the synthetic biology 
community and has presented at major international 
synthetic biology conferences (SB4.0, SB5.0 and SB6.0) and 
a range of other technical meetings. Members of the ISU act 
as judges for the iGEM policy & practices track and 
participate in the safety & security committee. The ISU has 
also worked to provide venues for interactions between the 
synthetic biology community and diplomats at the BWC, in 
order to explore the range of potential benefits, to showcase 
efforts to consider societal implications, and to enable a 
discussion of security implications. Each year, the ISU 
publishes a background document on possible advances 
relevant to the BWC and since 2008 this has regularly 
included elements on synthetic biology. The role of the ISU is 
not to tell States what is relevant, but rather to highlight new 
areas of science that they should perhaps consider. Evidence 
is gathered based on research discussed at synthetic biology 
meetings, publications in scientific journals, and work brought 
to the attention of the ISU by experts within the BWC and 
synthetic biology communities.
There is general agreement among States Parties of the 
BWC that developments in science and technology, including 
synthetic biology, can be used to our benefit, for example 
helping to combat diseases, as well as for prohibited 
purposes - and they can also be used to help strengthen 
compliance with the BWC. However, it was argued that it is 
difficult to anticipate which implications a specific advance 
might have. It was noted that determining this is beyond the 
mandate of the ISU and that national technical experts have 
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the most influence in this respect. However, it was noted that 
agreement among national technical experts is not the end of 
the story. Common understandings need to be written down 
in the BWC Meeting of States Parties report and this 
presents challenges because written outputs become a 
process of negotiation between diplomats. This process can 
become one of trading sentence for sentence, leading to a 
disconnect between the text produced and the underlying 
technical assessments. This has meant, for example, that 
paragraphs outlining areas of concern have had to be 
preceded by paragraphs listing all the potential benefits; and 
that the final text will usually emphasise that nothing should 
be done to restrict the peaceful use of biology.
The presentation went on to examine where evidence comes 
from in other processes. The Organisation for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons Scientific Advisory Board Temporary 
Working Group on Chemical and Biological Convergence, for 
example, looked at using biology to synthesise chemicals. 
There was considerable discussion of synthetic biology and 
the working group had regular briefings from practicing 
synthetic biologists, representatives from synthetic biology 
companies and a DIYbio group. The WHO expert 
consultation on Dual Use Research of Concern also 
included a panel on synthetic biology which included 
practicing synthetic biologists, representatives from a 
gene synthesis company and the iGEM safety 
committee founder. The panel proved to be so useful 
that they were invited to reconvene at the start of the 
next day. Global science bodies have also convened a 
series of events to look at implications of science and 
technology developments for the BWC and the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. These meetings included 
practicing scientists, representatives from companies, 
national technical experts, experts from international 
organisations and experts from the BWC and the Chemical 
Weapons Convention communities. 
The presentation concluded by suggesting that national 
processes are considerably more opaque since those 
involved in it generally cannot talk about it. One of the few 
good sources of information about these is a paper by 
Kathleen Vogel.
“States Parties of the BWC 
agree that synthetic biology 
can be used to our benefit, as 
well as for prohibited 
purposes.” 
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Figure 4: iGEM has been an important venue for engagement between the 
synthetic biology and the security communities.
Credit: Image reproduced with kind permission of the BWC Implementation Support Unit
Jefferson, Lentzos & Marris
Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity: How Scared Should We Be?  34
The Realities of the Research
Presentation by Jim Ajioka
Department of Pathology, University of 
Cambridge
The presentation began by stressing that synthetic biology is 
the engineering of biology, and that the design-build-test 
engineering cycle is central to that endeavour. The design 
principles needed to implement this cycle are essentially 
composed of scientific knowledge. A range of different types 
and sources of scientific knowledge can be used, including 
scientific literature, patents and laboratory notebooks. 
Knowledge about negative results - things that did not work - 
can save time but unfortunately there is almost no 
dissemination about such failures. The necessary design 
tools and materials - databases, analytical tools, and 
repositories - are largely publicly available, although some 
resources are more open than others.
The presentation went on to explore the 2001 experiment by 
Jackson et al. in which researchers inserted the gene for 
interleukin 4 (IL-4) into the mousepox virus (see Box 1 in 
Appendix 1). The aim of this research was to produce a virus 
that would induce infertility in mice, but the virus created was 
unexpectedly found to be lethal to mice. The significant 
aspect of this study was that the altered virus even killed 
mice that had previously been immunised against mousepox. 
This experiment had raised concerns and is often cited as an 
example to demonstrate that 'gain of function' is possible to 
engineer. The presentation proceeded to examine whether it 
would be possible to develop a lethal vaccination-resistant 
smallpox virus, using synthetic biology’s design-build-test 
cycle. It was noted that accounts of this experiment in non-
scientific arenas do not pay sufficient attention to related 
scientific literature that provides important context for 
assessing the threat caused by its publication.
The whole DNA sequence of the variola virus genome is 
available in publicly accessible databases. There are (or soon 
will be) publicly accessible tools and protocols necessary for 
the design and build stages. But it would still be necessary to 
obtain the viral material, and variola is not easily available 
from strain repositories. An alternative would be to engineer 
vaccinia instead, which is available and is closely related. One 
of the challenges for this kind of work is that virus culture 
requires a sterile environment, and this is not a simple matter. 
It also requires expensive equipment and reagents; and 
making a recombinant virus is not a routine procedure. This 
means that it would be hard to do in a DIY lab, but would be 
possible in a well-equipped and well-funded laboratory, 
operated by trained scientists.
The testing stage of the engineering cycle would be 
particularly problematic. Testing in mice is of limited value 
because humans do not necessarily react in the same way; 
Jefferson, Lentzos & Marris
Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity: How Scared Should We Be?  35
and it would not be possible to find a human population 
willing to voluntarily participate in such testing. This means 
that it is not possible to go through the design-build-test 
cycle when developing a bioweapon.
It was noted that an experiment testing IL-4 gene expression 
in vaccinia had been performed prior to the mousepox 
experiment. Insertion of the IL-4 gene exacerbated the 
infection but did not confer massive lethality, as in the 
Jackson et al. experiment with mousepox. This demonstrates 
that it is not possible to extrapolate from one experiment to 
another, even when the viruses are closely related and even 
in the same host (in this case, mouse).
It was argued that we have to be careful when talking about 
‘gain of function’, because losing a gene can in some cases 
lead to gaining a phenotypic function. For example one virus 
homologue of the IL-1 receptor, called B15D15R, is mutated 
in variola and does not work. Since IL-1 promotes fever, this 
means that when this gene is lost, host IL-1 is not ‘soaked 
up’ by B15D15R, so the virus gains a function (to induce 
fever).
In conclusion, it was argued that going through this example 
of the IL-4 experiment and how it could be used to develop a 
bioweapon illustrates the unpredictability of biological 
responses. Although there have been tremendous advances 
in the development of tools and protocols to drive the 
engineering design-build-test cycle, the bottom line is that we 
do not, at present, have enough information to know the 
design rules that would enable us to construct a lethal pox 
virus using synthetic biology.
Looking forward, both scientists and non-scientists need to 
take a more balanced and dispassionate view of the potential 
to engineer bioweapons because the potential to engineer 
bioweapons will change over time and each case is bespoke,  
thus requiring independent, periodic review.
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Figure 5: Some workshop participants stressed synthetic biology is an engineering 
discipline that aims to implement the design-build-test engineering cycle.
Credit: Image reproduced with kind permission of Jim Ajioka.
Discussion in Session 4
Discussion in this session began with a question about the 
timescales involved in the design-build-test cycle. It was noted 
that this is difficult to anticipate and is dependent on the type 
of project being conducted. Drawing on the example of the 
Artemisinin developed by the company Amyris, it was argued 
that while the original work required a decade and an 
enormous amount of funds and person hours, this work was 
then used to develop an industrial approach and the company 
was able to produce their next product - biodiesel - with far 
fewer funds and researchers. The whole 
point of the engineering approach to 
industrialisation is to make each iteration of 
the design-test-build cycle quicker and 
easier; and to enable work to be transferred 
from one purpose to another.
Discussion then returned again to the 
question of the extent to which the 
engineering of biology is achievable. 
Synthetic biology aims to exercise control in 
the design, characterisation and 
construction of biological parts, devices 
and systems, in order to produce more 
predictable biological systems. However, some participants 
felt it would be important to consider that there might be limits 
to the level of control and predictability that the engineering 
approach could achieve over the complexity and contingency 
of biology. Scale-up was identified as a key challenge in this 
respect, in particular for viral systems. Producing larger 
quantities of virus requires serial passage in cell culture, and 
viruses will necessarily incur mutations during that process. 
Moreover, these mutations will tend to lead to a loss of 
virulence (the viruses will be attenuated), which is problematic 
if the aim is to develop a bioweapon. Selection - be it natural 
or artificial - is a driving force that has to be contended with.
Questions were raised about how much knowledge synthetic 
biologists need to have about biological systems in order to be 
able to engineer them; and it was suggested that synthetic 
biology was at a similar stage to the Wright brothers with 
respect to the development of planes, in the sense that they 
did not know whether or not a flying plane could exist. In 
response, it was pointed out that even today, world experts in 
aeronautical engineering do not fully understand wing 
turbulence, but this has not prevented the development of 
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We do not need to know everything 
about biology before being able to do 
synthetic biology: even today, world 
experts in aeronautical engineering do 
not fully understand wing turbulence, but 
this has not prevented the development 
of commercial aviation.
commercial aviation. Basic research and commercial 
development in aeronautics continue in parallel: we do not 
need to know everything about wing turbulence to fly a plane 
across the world. Similarly, we do we do not need to know 
everything about biology before being able to do synthetic 
biology; and it was suggested that biology and synthetic 
biology should be considered to be different but 
complementary, just like chemistry and chemical engineering.
The historical example of the Wright brothers was also used to 
raise the issue of timespan. Drawing on an example developed 
in the book by Rob Carlson, it was pointed out that there was 
a long interval of (approximately 90 years) between the first 
flight by the Wright brothers and the Boeing 777, which was 
the first airplane designed on computers, tested on 
computers, and built predominantly without wind tunnel 
testing.
This led to a discussion about the extent to which synthetic 
biology was, or not, distinct from previous forms of ‘genetic 
engineering’. It was suggested that there was absolutely no 
engineering practice in previous forms of ‘genetic engineering’ 
- that were simply the bespoke manipulation of genetic 
material - and that the term had been coined in order to 
suggest that the researchers involved knew what they were 
doing. Synthetic biologists expressed frustration about the fact 
that many people do not understand that synthetic biology is, 
in contrast, ‘proper engineering’. In response, it was pointed 
out that when scientists talked about ‘genetic engineering’ in 
the 1970s, they also stressed that what they 
were doing was much more systematic and 
rational than previous forms of genetic 
manipulation, such as animal and plant 
breeding. This can help to explain why some 
people are sceptical of the ‘engineering’ claims 
made today for synthetic biology.
It was pointed out that most synthetic biology 
research is conducted with E. coli, which is an 
academic tool with some industrial 
applications; but that the Synthetic Yeast 2.0 
project was an example of how the field was 
developing work with more industrially relevant 
organisms. It was also suggested that the choice of 
microorganism used could affect public discussions, because 
members of the general public often express more disgust at 
the idea of using E. coli than yeast. Members of the public 
associate E. coli with health threats and faeces - which is 
accurate, but not for the strains used in laboratories - whereas 
there is a better reception to the idea of genetically 
manipulating yeast, because it is used to make familiar 
products such as beer, bread, champagne, and even 
chocolate. Some synthetic biology projects for the production 
of biofuels and biobutanol are now using clostridia. This has 
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Some participants felt it would be 
important to consider that there 
might be limits to the level of control 
and predictability that the 
engineering approach could achieve 
over the complexity and contingency 
of biology.
relatives that produce botulism but is also used in Botox, 
which has medical and cosmetic applications. If synthetic 
biology wants to expand the range of organisms used in the 
future, concerns about misuse may emerge from a lack of 
understanding of microbes and of biology among lay people.
The session ended with a discussion of why synthetic biology 
was being tangled up with concerns about bioterrorism. It was 
argued that if synthetic biology could lead to a situation where 
there was such good confidence in the engineering cycle that 
you could produce a weapon that would function in a 
predictable way without any need for trials and prototyping, 
that could have serious security implications; because testing 
is the stage that is most difficult to conduct in secret. 
Thus, in terms of threat assessment, the prospect of a 
reliable trials-free biological engineering is worrying. For 
some participants, this meant that the promises made 
about the prospects for synthetic biology to help meet 
global challenges, (for example, to produce biofuels and 
new pharmaceuticals) is directly linked with concerns 
about biosecurity. Others, however, argued that the 
technology needs to be disentangled from the human 
beings who might want to use it for bioterrorism, and 
refuted the idea that there is necessarily a correlation 
between advances in synthetic biology and the rise of the 
biosecurity threat.
It was noted that in the context of the BWC, there are now 
annual reviews of developments in science and technology 
that could have the potential for misuse, and that the focus is 
on identifying possibilities, not probabilities. It was also noted 
that the treaty, while primarily focused on the prohibition of 
biological weapons, also emphasises prevention of 
bioweapons development and the responsible development of 
science. 
It was argued that from a security perspective, it is important 
to understand how developments in a technology could 
change the equation and to be aware of what threats could 
emerge in the short, medium and long term. A fully synthetic 
microbe is probably a long term issue. But in the shorter term, 
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The BWC was created in an age 
where weapons development 
necessitated the movement of 
bacterial specimens and 
equipment. If - as is often stated 
- biology is now becoming an 
information science, this would 
raise difficult questions.
one could, for example, envisage engineering the metabolic 
pathway to produce a toxin such as saxitoxin, which is 
currently only available in very small quantities, by extraction 
from shellfish. Potential long-term threats also need to be 
considered so that they can be addressed before they occur.
It was pointed out that the BWC was created in an age where 
weapons development necessitated the movement of 
bacterial specimens and equipment. If - as is often stated - 
biology is now becoming an information science, this would 
raise difficult questions and the security community would 
need the help of practising synthetic biologists to help to 
address them.
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Session 5: General discussion
The general discussion began with feedback on the Scoping 
Report that had been prepared for the meeting. This 
document identified five recurring ‘myths’ about the dual use 
threat of synthetic biology that dominate discussions in policy 
arenas and the media, and highlighted some key challenges to 
this narrative (see Appendix 1). Feedback was generally 
positive, but concerns were raised about the use of the term 
‘myths’ as it can imply a polarisation between ‘myths’ and 
realities, as if everything in the dominant narrative is 
untrue and all the challenges identified in the Scoping 
Report are ‘realities’. But there are elements of truth 
and falsity in both ways of framing the issue. It was also 
noted that myths serve to mobilise support and 
resources and that further discussion of the purposes 
the myths are serving would be valuable.
A number of themes from the day’s discussion were 
returned to, in particular the role of media, the question 
of the extent to which synthetic biology would make 
biology ‘easier to engineer’, and interpretations of the 
concept of ‘de-skilling’ biology. It was noted that the 
role of the media is not just to communicate or teach 
science, but also to entertain and make money, and that there 
are many ‘news values’ that characterise a ‘good’ news story. 
With respect to de-skilling, caution was urged in the way this 
concept is interpreted. Drawing a parallel to the Industrial 
Revolution, it was suggested that synthetic biology is moving 
towards a more systematic process, but this does not 
necessarily mean skills become irrelevant.
Drawing a further parallel to furniture making from Chippendale 
in the 18th century to IKEA in the 21st, it was pointed out that 
de-skilling a process does not imply that anyone can do it, but 
involves moving from a system that relies on a small number of 
highly skilled craftsmen towards a more systematic process. 
Technological and other developments reduce the amount of 
specialised craft knowledge that is required to complete a 
process successfully. This makes the process less dependent 
on individual skill, and more systematic and reliable, but often 
requires more complicated machinery. Thus, even if the de-
skilling of synthetic biology makes the engineering of biology 
easier, this does not mean that synthetic biology will become 
accessible to any layperson.
One example of such a development in synthetic biology is 
Gibson Assembly, which has reduced the number of hours of 
Jefferson, Lentzos & Marris
Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity: How Scared Should We Be?  41
Caution was urged in the way in 
which ‘de-skilling’ is interpreted: 
even if the de-skilling of synthetic 
biology makes the engineering of 
biology easier, this does not mean 
that synthetic biology will become 
accessible to any layperson.
mindless lab work that was previously necessary to put DNA 
fragments together. The experimental protocol does not 
always work and there is still a degree of tacit knowledge 
involved: laboratory researchers have to learn how to make it 
work through personal experience, and from their peers - but 
in the context of a professional lab, stitching DNA fragments 
together is definitely becoming easier that it was before.
Questions were raised about the way in which the bioterrorism 
threat is understood, in particular who did we imagine were 
the actors who would try to use synthetic biology for 
malevolent uses? It was noted that would-be terrorists have 
other low-tech options at their disposal, and that even 
unsophisticated threats or attacks that cause few (or even no) 
casualties can cause terror. It was suggested that the WDM 
bioterrorism scenario is much less likely, although that is the 
type of mass impact scenario typically envisaged is 
discussions of synthetic biology. Thus, low-impact and high-
impact scenarios are often conflated in the debate. It was 
noted that both high- and low-tech scenarios are examined in 
the context of defence and security, and that synthetic biology 
could be an enabling technology for both categories. It was 
pointed out that terrorists have many means at their disposal 
that do not require the use of bioweapons, but that some 
groups were fanatical about using the latest science and 
technology.
These discussions have been taken into account to produce a 
revised version of the Scoping Report, to be published in a 
forthcoming article in Frontiers for Public Health.
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Key Themes
The workshop provided a fairly unique forum for actors from 
different disciplines and professions to interact together in an 
environment that facilitated a fruitful debate and raised some 
issues that are not often aired in discussions about synthetic 
biology. The first part of this report has summarised those 
discussions, replicating as accurately as possible what was 
said by the workshop participants, without commenting on 
those statements, and without endorsing (or not) any of the 
views expressed. In this section, we, the authors, take a step 
back and use our social science expertise to analyse the 
dynamics of those discussions. We tease out the key 
arguments that participants made throughout the day, and 
how they relate to each other and to social science 
scholarship in these areas. We believe that this analysis 
reveals a set of topics that need to be addressed further in 
order to foster a more productive debate about synthetic 
biology and biosecurity.
Beyond ‘myths’ versus ‘realities’
The use of the term ‘myths’ can imply a polarisation between 
‘myths’ and ‘realities’, as if everything identified as a ‘myth’ is 
imaginary and all the challenges to those myths are real, but 
there are elements of truth and falsity in both. What is needed 
is a more refined assessment of biosecurity threats related to 
synthetic biology that takes into account not only the material 
and informational aspects of the field, but also other important 
socio-technical dimensions that will shape the development of 
the field; and that also adopts a more nuanced view of the 
‘de-skilling’ of biology.
Just because it is hyped doesn’t mean it 
should be ignored
Biosecurity experts present at the workshop stressed that 
even if the threats associated with synthetic biology are 
exaggerated, this does not mean that they should not be 
investigated. Misuse scenarios serve a variety of functions, 
some of which are to represent possible, though not 
necessarily probable, future scientific developments in order to 
explore potential long-term security challenges. In this policy 
context, speculative thinking can be helpful to identify worst-
case scenarios and potential responses to these, and should 
not be discounted as mythmaking. However, problems arise 
when these scenarios are portrayed as scientific reality in the 
present, or as inevitable in the future, which tends to occur in 
the media, in political and diplomatic forums, and in some 
bioethical analyses. This diverts political and policy discourse 
and initiatives in unhelpful ways.
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The need to distinguish different categories of 
terrorists, attacks, and weapons
There are different assessments of the nature, importance, 
urgency and scale of the bioterrorism threat, and these have 
varied over time and across countries. There are different 
kinds of ‘users’ of bioweapons, and they can have very 
different motivations and objectives. It is often assumed that 
terrorists would seek to generate mass casualties, but 
historical examples demonstrate that some terrorist attacks 
aim to cause few casualties and still cause massive disruption 
and terror. Assessments of biosecurity threats often conflate 
these different kinds of attacks, and it would be helpful if they 
distinguished more clearly between high-impact and low-
impact scenarios, and between high-tech and low-tech 
weapons.
Engagement between synthetic biology and 
security communities is crucial
It was suggested that more engagement is needed in the UK 
between the security community and the synthetic biology 
community, in order to ensure that scientists know which 
authorities to contact if they have concerns, and to facilitate 
the security community’s role in identifying relevant 
developments. In the US, the engagement by the security 
community is much more proactive and well resourced, via the 
FBI outreach programme.
There are tangible and intangible barriers to 
the misuse and reproducibility of science
Drawing on failures encountered by former state and terrorist-
sponsored bioweapons programmes, it was argued that the 
development of bioweapons is difficult: biological organisms 
are unpredictable, scale-up is particularly challenging, there 
are many stages in the process, each stage requires different 
expertise performed by different teams, and these teams need 
to coordinate effectively. Drawing on the example of the 2002 
polio synthesis experiment, it was argued that while some 
aspects of biological research have become easier, some 
techniques remain craft-like and require specialist, tacit 
knowledge which is difficult to learn and transfer between 
different laboratories. This means it is essentially impossible to 
reproduce a scientific experiment using only the information 
contained in a published scientific article. It was argued that 
analyses of dual use threats tend to focus on the material, 
informational aspects of science and technology rather than a 
more in-depth analysis of these kinds of socio-technical 
factors; and that taking into account these dimensions would 
lead to more refined assessments of the biosecurity threats 
posed by synthetic biology.
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Synthetic biology is an engineering discipline, 
so these barriers will become irrelevant
Some of the synthetic biologists present at the workshop 
stressed that it is important to understand that synthetic 
biology is different from molecular biology; it is the engineering 
of biology. These synthetic biologists stressed that the 
engineering approach is composed of standardised protocols,  
tools and platform technologies, including professional 
registries of well-characterised biological parts, that will enable 
the implementation of a ‘design-built-test cycle’. Thus, 
synthetic biology aims to exercise control in the design, 
characterisation and construction of biological parts, devices 
and systems, in order to produce more predictable biological 
systems.
This argument is frequently made as a means to distinguish 
synthetic biology from previous forms of ‘genetic engineering’. 
In the context of this workshop, it was also specifically used to 
argue that, as the engineering process becomes more 
systematic, the tangible and intangible barriers described 
above for the development of bioweapons, and for the 
reproducibility of scientific experiments from one laboratory to 
another, would become irrelevant. According to this depiction 
of synthetic biology, it will essentially eliminate the need for 
tacit knowledge and specialist skills, and will be able to control 
the contingency and complexity of living organisms; with some 
participants suggesting, for example, that engineers can 
produce experimental protocols that are so reliable they can 
be described as ‘bullet-proof’, and that all the daily grind of 
laboratory work can already be outsourced to service 
companies.
This position was challenged in two ways. Firstly, there were 
discussions about the extent to which synthetic biology has 
achieved, or ever will achieve, the goal of transforming biology 
into an engineering discipline. The consensus was that it had 
not yet, but for some participants it was only a question of 
time before it did. For example, although there are limits to the 
work conducted by iGEM teams and the registry of biological 
parts created through that competition, these will be 
overcome as the field becomes more professionalised. 
Secondly, there were discussions about the extent to which an 
engineering approach would eliminate the need for the kinds 
of tacit knowledge and other socio-technical factors that had 
impeded the development of large state-sponsored 
bioweapons programmes in the past. During these 
discussions, the more extreme depiction of synthetic biology 
as an engineering discipline tended to become tempered, and 
some participants pointed out that skills and large 
infrastructures remained important in other (non-biological) 
fields of engineering.
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The ‘synthetic biology/engineering conundrum’
An interesting tension emerged during the workshop. On the 
one hand, if tacit knowledge remains important in synthetic 
biology, then this implies that it will not be easily accessible to 
outsiders and this reduces concerns about the dual use 
threat. On the other hand, if synthetic biology is an engineering 
discipline and if this means that we overcome the barriers 
posed by tacit knowledge, then this implies that it could 
become more accessible to outsiders and this increases the 
dual use threat. Thus, biosecurity concerns are heightened 
when the more extreme depiction of synthetic biology’s ability 
to engineer biology is emphasised. We characterise this as the 
‘synthetic biology/engineering conundrum’.
What do we mean by ‘de-skilling’?
This conundrum arises because the ‘de-skilling’ of biology is 
often misrepresented as meaning that any layperson, working 
outside professional scientific institutions, is or soon will be 
able to design and produce organisms that behave predictably 
and reliably. However, a different understanding of ‘de-skilling’, 
and of the engineering approach of synthetic biology, emerged 
during the workshop discussions, in which dependence on the 
craft skills of a small number of highly trained individuals is 
reduced for some parts of the production process, usually by 
standardisation and mechanisation. This does not mean that 
skills become irrelevant or that all aspects of the work become 
easier. This was illustrated during workshop discussions by an 
analogy with the shift from Chippendale to IKEA furniture. An 
analogy with aeronautical engineering was also used, to 
illustrate that specialised teams, considerable expertise, 
complicated machinery, advanced technology, trouble 
shooting - and thus organisational factors - continue to be 
required when a design and engineering approach develops. 
From this perspective biology can become industrialised and 
subject to an engineering approach without necessarily 
becoming accessible to laypeople working outside institutions,  
including those with hostile intentions.
If we are to disentangle synthetic biology and biosecurity 
concerns, and to have more nuanced discussions about the 
realities of the threat (how scared should we be?) we believe 
that it is necessary to have realistic and evidence based 
discussions about the extent to which synthetic biology is, or 
ever will be, an engineering discipline; and whether, in 
practice, this would reduce the importance of tacit knowledge, 
specialist expertise of different kinds, collective work, large 
infrastructures, and organisational factors. Such discussions 
would need to identify those aspects of the work that would 
become easier – in the sense that they can, for example, be 
automated and reliably performed by a robot - and those 
which are likely to remain difficult, in the sense that they still 
require craft skills to be successfully achieved. It would also be 
more accurate and helpful to speak of synthetic biology 
making the engineering of biology easier, rather than easy.
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Blaming the media
Another theme that permeated discussions throughout the 
day was coverage of science in the media. Some synthetic 
biologists and some policy makers argued that the way in 
which the media reported science was a major obstacle for 
rational debate. They argued that the media ‘sensationalises’ 
stories; likes controversy and horror stories; oversimplifies 
complex scientific research; gives too much weight to 
individual maverick scientists who behave irresponsibly rather 
than the consensus from the more responsible scientific 
community; and trivialises issues by latching onto key words 
and seeking catchy headlines. These participants felt that the 
media should be more scientific, reporting facts based on 
scientific literature rather than the views of individuals.
However, for good or ill, the primary role of the media is not to 
communicate science calmly and rationally. It is an industry 
that, just like any other, seeks to make money, which means 
that increasing sales and advertising revenues are key 
objectives, and in many cases this is best achieved by 
entertaining their audiences. In addition, it is entirely legitimate, 
and perhaps important, for debates among scientists about 
the purposes and findings of research to be represented, so 
that citizens are more able to understand and participate in 
such debates and to have their say about future directions. 
Blaming the media for generating scare stories is also 
inaccurate in the sense that journalists are often not the 
original source. For example the potential for misuse of the 
H5N1 research conducted by Fouchier was first raised as an 
important problem by the biosecurity experts at the US 
National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), not 
by journalists. It is also interesting to note that scientists often 
perceive dramatic scare stories about science as damaging, 
but that dramatic – and often equally overstated - stories of 
scientific breakthroughs, which are the mirror image of such 
scares, are usually welcomed as generating support for 
science.
Moreover, although this was not explicitly stated during the 
workshop, an underlying assumption was that lay members of 
the public are easily swayed by negative accounts of science, 
and that the tenor of media reports will determine whether ‘the 
public’ will be ‘for’ or ‘against’ a particular technology. There is 
also a presumption that laypeople are unaware that media 
stories are sensationalised. This set of beliefs about science 
and the media, and about public understanding of science is, 
however, challenged by social science research. Research 
demonstrates, for example, that members of the public are 
not passive recipients of media messages. On the contrary, 
they are exposed to - and select from - multiple sources of 
information, and are aware of the ways in which media stories 
are constructed. They create their own understandings on the 
basis of many sources, and do not merely naively accept this 
or that scare story.1 Research from the field of social studies of 
science also undermines simplistic accounts of ‘the public’ 
and demonstrates that lay people can hold nuanced views on 
scientific and technological developments, which takes into 
account the social, economic and cultural settings of scientific 
institutions.2
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1 See for example: Bucchi, M. (1998). Science and the Media. Routledge; and Kitzinger, J. 
(2004). “Audience and Readership Research” in The SAGE Handbook of Media Studies, Sage.
2 For a review, see Wynne, B. (1995). “Public Understanding of Science” in S. Jasanoff et al. 
(Eds) Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, Sage.
‘Hype’ as a double-edged sword
Discussions about the extent to which synthetic biology 
differs, or not, from previous forms of genetic engineering, and 
about the extent to which the ‘engineering vision’ of synthetic 
biology is achievable, often recur in policy discussions about 
synthetic biology. In this report, it is not our role to arbitrate 
between the different views expressed on this topic. Rather, 
we are interested in how these arguments played out during 
the workshop, and the implications they have for the 
entanglement between synthetic biology and biosecurity. 
Thus, what was especially striking was that, for some 
participants, the argument that synthetic biology is (or soon 
will be) an engineering discipline was directly associated with 
heightened concerns about the potential biosecurity threat of 
synthetic biology: the greater the stress on this promise, the 
greater the estimation of the perils. But for other participants, 
notably some of the synthetic biologists, this link between 
optimistic promises and heightened concerns - the ‘synthetic 
biology/engineering conundrum’ - was not obvious.
It is important to reflect on the role that these dynamics play in 
popular representations of synthetic biology. Discussions at 
the workshop illustrated how different communities stress – 
and perhaps overstress - particular issues in particular 
contexts, and how this plays an important role to construct 
and maintain resources and support for each of these 
communities. Thus, scientists who promote synthetic biology 
need to portray an optimistic vision of the potential of the 
engineering approach to biology as part of their endeavours to 
develop support for a new field of research which they believe 
has great significance and potential. Conversely, scientists in 
adjacent fields of biology often seek to emphasise the 
messiness and contingency of biology in order to maintain 
support for their areas of research. Actors who work in or 
contribute to the security field, including some policy makers, 
social scientists and natural scientists often exaggerate the 
‘dual use threat’ in order to attract resources to their own 
work. Researchers who conduct social studies of science and 
technology often seek to emphasise the complexity of real 
world situations, and the importance of social dimensions of 
science, in order to justify the need for their expertise. What is 
needed, we would argue, is for each of these groups of actors 
to recognise the ‘performativity’ of their own discourses - that 
is to say, the ways in which they have consequences. Some of 
these consequences are intended, but there can also be 
unintended consequences that are detrimental to their own 
interests and/or to the nature of public debate. We argue that 
a better understanding and acknowledgement of these 
dynamics would help towards developing more productive 
discussions in which the different communities involved could 
move beyond simply defending their own positions. This was 
in part the aim of this workshop and we feel that we made a 
step in that direction.
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Feedback Received
Feedback from the workshop participants was overwhelmingly 
positive. The extended discussion periods, broad range of 
expertise, and the ‘genuine sense of sharing perspectives’ 
were repeatedly mentioned in the feedback forms as the best 
aspects of the workshop. 
Most of the participants (15 of the 17 who completed the 
questionnaire) said the workshop would have an impact on 
their future work. Policy experts noted they would ‘continue to 
highlight the value of the genuine engagement by the synthetic 
biology community with the societal impact of their work’, 
‘take on board the possible need for guidance to the scientific 
community on how to deal with issues of concern and who to 
contact’, and ‘think about a national regulatory framework, 
e.g. an Advisory Committee for Synthetic Biology’. Synthetic 
biologists noted that they would ‘think more carefully about 
responsibilities of publishing research that may have dual use’, 
‘think more about biosecurity in design’, and ‘better frame 
what synthetic biology enables’. Social scientists noted the 
discussions ‘have stimulated new ideas’, ‘will feed directly into 
on-going research’, and ‘will inform thinking and teaching’. 
One participant commented: ‘The workshop was extremely 
valuable in promoting cross-national perspectives on synthetic 
biology. It stimulated discussions about the technical 
complexities and challenges in synbio that would not have 
occurred in the United States.’ Reflecting these complexities 
and challenges, another participant said one of the key issues 
to emerge from the discussions was ‘that there is still some 
way to go to create a common narrative of the security 
implications of synthetic biology.’
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Workshop Programme
10:00-10:10	 Welcome
	 Richard Kitney
	 Claire Marris
10:10-11:20	 Session 1: How have concerns about biological weapons and bioterrorism emerged and evolved over 
time?
 Filippa Lentzos: ‘The world’s most deadly weapons’: The politics of bioterrorism
	 Debora MacKenzie: A case study of the 2011 H5N1 avian influenza transmission studies
	 DISCUSSION (40 minutes)
11:20-12:30 Session 2: How have ‘dual use’ concerns about synthetic biology been framed in the media and in policy 
discourse?
Catherine Jefferson: Synthetic biology and biosecurity in the media
James Revill: Synthetic biology and ‘dual use’ concerns in policy discourse
DISCUSSION (40 minutes)
12:30-13:30	       LUNCH
13:30-14:40	 Session 3: What are the tangible and intangible barriers to state and non-state production of biological 
weapons?
Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley: What are the barriers to weaponisation?
Kathleen Vogel: What is the role of tacit knowledge in determining what malevolent actors could achieve?
DISCUSSION (40 minutes)
14:40-15:50	 Session 4: What scientific developments within synthetic biology might be relevant to misuse concerns, 
now or in future?
Piers Millett: What evidence and expertise are drawn on in assessments of misuse risks? 
Jim Ajioka: What are the realities of scientific research in this area?
DISCUSSION (40 minutes)
15:50-16:15	       BREAK
16:15-16:55	       General discussion
16:55-17:00       Closing Remarks
              Paul Freemont
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Appendix 1: Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity: Challenging the ‘Myths’
Scoping Report for the Workshop on ‘Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity’ held at King’s College London on 28th February 2014. Prepared by 
Catherine Jefferson, Filippa Lentzos and Claire Marris, Department of Social Science, Health and Medicine, King’s College London and 
distributed to all participants in advance of the workshop. Please note that a revised version of this document will be published in the Journal 
Frontiers in Health and wherever possible that article should be cited in preference to this version.
Introduction
A common narrative has emerged in the media and in policy arenas, in which advances in biosciences are seen to make biology easier and 
more accessible, and this is presumed to increase the ‘dual use’ threat, i.e. the potential for legitimate peaceful research to be misused for the 
production of biological weapons. Developments in synthetic biology, a field that emerged at the start of the 21st century with the stated aim 
of ‘making biology easier to engineer’, have further fuelled these concerns. One school of synthetic biology aims to build a set of standard 
biological parts whose functions have been well characterised and which can be assembled in a modular fashion into devices to produce liv-
ing organisms that predictably perform human-designed functions. Concerns have been expressed that this, combined with open online ac-
cess to DNA sequences of living organisms (including viruses and other pathogens) and the reduction in price for DNA synthesis, could make 
biology increasingly accessible to non-biologists and amateurs. The emergence of ‘do-it-yourself’ (DIY) biology communities have come to 
epitomise this supposed trend towards greater ease of access and the associated potential threat from rogue actors.
However, these dual use concerns are largely based on promissory constructions of synthetic biology and speculative assumptions about the 
field’s ability to produce well-characterised biological parts that function predictably in living organisms; assumptions that may not accurately 
reflect current scientific realities. Furthermore, there remain a number of tangible and intangible barriers to the production of biological weap-
ons using synthetic biology. There are considerable challenges involved in successfully creating a viable biological threat agent, and further 
challenges to turn these into weapons. Amateurs lack the necessary specialist ‘tacit’ knowledge and institutional support to overcome these 
challenges; and rogue actors have other means at their disposal that are less onerous. In discussions about biosecurity, it is also important to 
distinguish between weapons designed to generate terror from weapons designed to cause mass destruction: terror weapons do not need to 
cause extensive physical harm and thus do not require sophisticated weaponisation.
This Scoping Report identifies five recurring ‘myths’ about the dual use threat of synthetic biology that dominate discussions in policy arenas 
and the media. It highlights some key challenges to this narrative and suggests that the biosecurity threat may be exaggerated. This is not to 
argue that there is no threat, but rather to draw out some of the subtleties that frequently disappear from these discussions. Moreover, it is 
important to note that these ‘myths’ have power and perform real functions by mobilising support, resources and action. Emphasising the 
potential biosecurity threats of synthetic biology serves to bolster the speculative promises of the field. These myths also serve to attribute 
roles and influence to particular actors: they define who is legitimate to speak on these topics, what they can say, and where. They influence 
who gets funded, for what. Contrasting the ‘promises and perils’ of a field such as synthetic biology also aligns particularly well with the way in 
which science and technology is typically framed in mass media, and this serves to further fuel these myths.
The aim of the Flowers Consortium Workshop on ‘Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity’ is to examine the assumptions that underlie these ‘myths’ 
and to explore the implications for policy.
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2001 Mousepox Experiment
Australian researchers used genetic engineering techniques to insert the gene for interleukin-4 into the mousepox virus. 
They aimed to produce an altered virus that would induce infertility in mice and serve as an infectious contraceptive for pest 
control. However, the altered virus was found to be lethal to both mice that were naturally resistant to mousepox and mice 
that had been recently immunised against ordinary mousepox. The publication of these findings led to concerns that this 
could provide instructions to terrorists to produce novel biological weapons.
Jackson, RJ, Ramsay, AJ, et al. (2001) Expression of mouse interleukin-4 a recombinant ectromelia virus sup-
presses cytolytic lymphocyte responses and overcomes genetic resistance to mousepox, Journal of Virology, 
75(3): 1205-10.
2002 Poliovirus Experiment
Researchers at the State University of New York at Stony Brook synthesised the poliovirus without using any natural virus or 
viral components. They obtained published poliovirus RNA genome sequence information and converted this into DNA se-
quence data, which they then ordered from a commercial DNA synthesis company and assembled into a viral genome. En-
zymes were used to convert the DNA back into RNA and to translate the RNA into a functional virus. Publication of the re-
search article raised concerns that terrorists could synthesise viruses ‘from scratch’.
Cello, J, Paul, AV & Wimmer PE (2002) Chemical synthesis of poliovirus cDNA: Generation of infectious virus in the 
absence of natural template, Science, 297 (1016): 1016-18.
2005 Spanish Influenza Virus Experiment
Researchers at the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reconstructed the Spanish flu virus, which is thought to 
have killed around 50 million people during the 1918 pandemic, using a recently recovered genomic RNA. Concerns were 
expressed that publication of the full genome sequence could give bioterrorists the information necessary to make their own 
version of the virus.
Tumpey, TM, Basler, CF, et al. (2005) Characterisation of the reconstructed 1918 Spanish influenza pandemic vi-
rus, Science, 310: 77-80.
2011 H5N1 Virus Experiment
Researchers in the Netherlands and the USA developed a novel, contagious strain of the H5N1 ‘bird flu’ virus. They infected 
ferrets with genetically modified H5N1 and found that the modified H5N1 acquired small mutations during passage in fer-
rets, ultimately becoming airborne transmissible. When two papers relating to the research were submitted for publication to 
Science and Nature, concerns were raised about the dual use risk and the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecu-
rity (NSABB) recommended against full publication of the study. After additional consultations at the World Health Organisa-
tion, the NSABB reversed its position and recommended publication of revised versions of the papers.
Herfst, S, Schrauwen, EJA, et al. (2012) Airbourne transmission of influenza A/H5N1 virus between ferrets, Sci-
ence, 336(6088): 1534-41.c
Box 1: Examples of dual use experiments
Myth 1: DNA synthesis has become faster and cheaper and this will make it easier for terrorists 
to create biological threat agents.
DNA synthesis is one of the key enabling technologies of synthetic biology and the increasing speed and reduced costs of DNA synthesis have 
raised concerns that this technology could make it easier for bioterrorists to recreate dangerous viruses from scratch, especially when com-
plete DNA or RNA sequences for viruses and other pathogenic agents are increasingly freely available online. Reconstruction of poliovirus 
(2002) and Spanish influenza virus (2005) have come to epitomise this threat narrative (see Box 1).
‘With the spread of synthetic biology, some small scale research groups and even some individuals are now able to make the deadly 
Ebola and smallpox viruses and even some viruses against which all drugs are ineffective, thus making it much harder to counter biot-
errorism.’ (China 2011)
‘in the near future... the risk of nefarious use will rise because of the increasing speed and capacity [of synthetic genomics].’ ... ‘ten 
years from now, it may be easier to synthesize almost any pathogenic virus than to obtain it through other means.’(Garfinkel, Endy et 
al. 2007, pp. 12-13)
‘Synthetic biologists have already shown how terrorists could obtain life forms that now exist only in carefully guarded facilities, such 
as polio and 1918 influenza samples.’ (Maurer and Zoloth 2007, p. 16)
‘One potential misuse of synthetic biology would be to recreate known pathogens (such as the Ebola virus) in the laboratory as a 
means of circumventing the legal and physical controls on access to ‘select agents’ that pose a bioterrorism risk. Indeed, the feasibility 
of assembling an entire, infectious viral genome from a set of synthetic oligonucleotides has already been demonstrated for poliovirus 
and the Spanish influenza virus.’ (Tucker and Zilinskas 2006, p. 37)
Challenges:
Although DNA synthesis has become cheaper and quicker, it is still not fully accurate and reliable.
While the technology for synthesis of large DNA fragments has advanced, assembly of these fragments into larger segments is still a tech-
nical challenge.
Constructing a genome size DNA fragment is not the same as creating a functional genome. In particular, ensuring the desired expression 
of viral proteins is a complex challenge.
There are logistically easier and technologically less demanding sources of biological threat agents in nature (eg, soil-borne bacterial 
pathogens such as Bacillus anthracis and Clostridium botulinum).
Synthesis of a biological threat agent is not equal to weaponisation. Considerable knowledge and resources would be necessary for the 
processes of scaling up, storage and developing a suitable dissemination method. It is however important to distinguish between 
weapons designed to generate terror from weapons designed to cause mass destruction: terror weapons do not need to cause exten-
sive physical harm and thus do not require sophisticated weaponisation (see challenges to Myth 5).
Genome synthesis companies have taken steps to screen sequence and consumer orders (though these measures are currently voluntary 
and only apply to double stranded DNA).
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Myth 2: Synthetic biology could be used to design radically new pathogens
In addition to recreating dangerous viruses, concerns have also been expressed that synthetic biology could be used to enhance the virulence 
or modify the transmissibility of known pathogens; or to create novel threat agents. The mousepox experiment (2001) and the H5N1virus ex-
periments (2011) have come to epitomise this threat narrative (see Box 1).
‘Synthetic biology’s efforts to reprogram life have raised concerns in some quarters that the technology could one day be used to 
make radically new weapons, such as pathogens that could be narrowly targeted towards populations with known genetic susceptibili-
ties.’ (Maurer and Zoloth 2007, p. 16)
‘The possibility of designing a new virus or bacterium a la carte could be used by bioterrorists to create new resistant pathogenic 
strains or organisms, perhaps even engineered to attack genetically specific sub-populations.’ (European Commission 2005, p. 18)
‘While nature has provided would-be terrorists an ample supply and selection of quite virulent viruses, there is concern that genetic 
technologies will be used to modify these already pathogenic agents and create ‘super-pathogens’, viruses that are more lethal and 
disruptive than naturally occurring pathogens, and that are designed to evade vaccines or to be resistant to drugs.’ (Collett 2006, p. 
95)
‘Living synthetic cells will likely be made in the next decade; synthetic pathogens more effective than wild or genetically engineered 
natural pathogens will be possible sometime thereafter...’ (Wheelis 2004)
‘Our concern is that publishing these experiments in detail would provide information to some person, organization, or government 
that would help them to develop similar mammal-adapted influenza A/H5N1 viruses for harmful purposes.’ (Members of the NSABB 
2012, p. 661)
Challenges:
There are significant technical and logistical challenges involved in creating a new human pathogen, or a more lethal or transmissible vari-
ant of a known pathogen. For example, the former Soviet biological weapons programme experienced difficulties with pleiotropy, 
where changing one gene to, say, make an agent more transmissible caused other traits such as pathogenicity to diminish.
There are logistically easier and technologically less demanding sources of biological threat agents in nature.
Synthesis of a biological threat agent is not equal to weaponisation (see challenges to Myth 5).
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Myth 3: Synthetic biology is de-skilling biology and making it easier for terrorists to exploit ad-
vances in the biosciences
The key goal of synthetic biology is to ‘make biology easier to engineer’ by building a set of standard biological parts whose functions have 
been well characterised and which can be assembled into functional devices and systems that reliably perform human-designed desired func-
tions in live organisms. Concerns have been expressed that this ‘de-skilling’ agenda could make it easier for non-specialists to exploit this 
technology to do harm. iGEM and the DIYbio community have come to epitomise this de-skilling narrative.
‘Synthetic biology strives to make the engineering of biology easier and more predictable.’ (The Royal Academy of Engineering 2009, 
p. 6)
‘Synthetic biology includes, as a principal part of its agenda, a sustained, well-funded assault on the necessity of tacit knowledge in 
bioengineering and thus on one of the most important current barriers to the production of biological weapons.’ (Mukunda, Oye et al. 
2009, p. 14)
‘The reagents and tools used in synthetic biology will eventually be converted into commercial kits, making it easier for biohackers to 
acquire them. Moreover, as synthetic biology training becomes increasingly available to students at the college and possibly high-
school levels, a ‘hacker culture’ may emerge, increasing the risk of reckless or malevolent experimentation.’ (Tucker and Zilinskas 
2006, p. 42)
‘Ethical issues arise particularly from dangers of using synthetic lethal and virulent pathogens for terrorist attacks, bio-war, or malefi-
cent uses (‘garage terrorism’, ‘bio-hacking’), particularly if knowledge and skills on how to produce such pathogens are freely avail-
able.’ (European Commission 2009, p. 43)
‘Imagining a world where practically anybody with an average IQ would have the ability to create novel organisms in their home ga-
rage...’ (Schmidt 2008, p. 2) 
Challenges:
This framing of the dual use threat is based on the assumption that synthetic biology already has made, or shortly will make, 'biology eas-
ier to engineer', by providing open-access online registries of well-characterised parts that can be easily assembled, by people with no 
specialist training, into devices and systems that predictably perform desired functions in live organisms. This does not necessarily 
reflect current realities in professional science laboratories.
Experiences of iGEM teams and DIYbio community labs tend to demonstrate the considerable challenges of successfully performing syn-
thetic biology experiments outside of professional settings, including the need for guided instruction, and for collective work.
Synthetic biology has not yet created weaponisable parts or devices.
There remain significant tangible and intangible barriers to adapting a technology for weaponisation (see challenges to Myth 5).
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Myth 4: Synthetic biology has led to the growth of a DIYbio community, which could offer dual 
use tools and equipment for bioterrorists seeking to do harm
Developments in synthetic biology are seen to be closely associated with the growth of the DIYbio community, and concerns are expressed 
that this could offer the knowledge, tools and equipment to bioterrorists seeking to do harm.
‘I worry about the garage scientist, about the do-your-own scientist, about the person who just wants to try and see if they can do it.’ 
(NSABB member in Zimmer 2012)
‘Although advocates emphasize the educational value and economic potential of DIY biology, some security analysts worry about the 
prospect of possible abuse for nefarious purposes... it has the potential both to benefit society and to cause much harm – if the people 
using DIY biology do so for malicious purposes, including criminal activities and terrorism.’ (Wolinsky 2009, pp. 684-5) 
‘We have to be aware and not be naive about the potential for misuse of this technology, particularly if it’s going to be democratized in 
the way that the DIY visionaries would like.’ (Tucker cf. Wolinsky 2009, p. 685) 
‘As synthetic biology techniques become easier and less expensive and the applications become more widely relevant, the range of 
practitioners expands to include scientists from a variety of disciplines; students at all levels, including high school; and amateur scien-
tists and hobbyists who may lack any formal affiliations with universities or research institutions. The diversity of practitioners will also 
include individuals of different ages and varied social and educational backgrounds who may not have been sensitized to the ethical 
social and legal norms of the traditional life science research communities.’ (NSABB 2010, p. 11)
Challenges:
The link between synthetic biology and DIYbio, and the level of sophistication of the experiments typically being performed in DIYbio 
community labs, is overstated (Wilson Center 2013, p. 10).
Members of DIY communities who are involved in more sophisticated experiments tend to be trained biologists, not amateurs.
The experiences of iGEM students and amateur members of the DIYbio community demonstrate the importance of tacit knowledge in 
successfully conducting even rudimentary biological experiments.
Members of DIYbio community labs are cognisant of safety and security concerns and are proactive in addressing and engaging on these 
issues.
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Myth 5: The bioterrorism myth? Terrorists want to pursue biological weapons for high conse-
quence, mass causality attacks
Bioterrorism has been portrayed in some media and policy circles as an imminent threat, and emphasis is placed on the use of biological 
weapons for high consequence, mass causality attacks.
“The national, state, and local governments in the United States are preparing for what is now called ‘not if, but when and how exten-
sive’ biological terrorism.” (Franz and Zajtchuk 2002, p. 493)
“The age of engineered biological weapons is here. It is now.” (Tara O'Toole in Drogin 2005)
“A few technicians of middling skill using a few thousand dollars worth of readily available equipment in a small and apparently in-
nocuous setting [could] mount a first-order biological attack.” (Senator Bill Frist 2005)
“Given the goal of some terrorist groups to use weapons that can be employed surreptitiously and generate dramatic impact, we ex-
pect to see terrorist use of some readily available biological and chemical weapons.” (US National Intelligence Council 2004, p. 100)
 “Al-Qaida and other terrorist groups remain interested in acquiring Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons.” 
(Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby 2004, p. 3)
Challenges:
Bioterrorists are portrayed as pursuing capabilities on the scale of twentieth century state biological weapons research and development 
programs, i.e., attempting to produce mass causality weapons. However, past bioterrorism attacks have typically been small-scale, 
low casualty events which have been perpetrated to cause panic and disruption rather than high impact. (For example, the 2001 an-
thrax letter attacks and 2013 ricin letter attacks, or the Rajneeshee cult use of salmonella in Oregon salad bars in 1984 in an attempt to 
sicken the electorate and influence the voting outcome.)
There are considerable barriers to acquiring a suitable biological agent. (For example, the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo group, which had con-
siderable financial resources, spent 3 to 4 years attempting to isolate Botulinum toxin and failed.) A terrorist would need to obtain the 
appropriate strain of the disease pathogen, handle the organism correctly, grow it in a way that will produce the appropriate character-
istics, and know how to store the culture and scale-up production properly.
There are also considerable barriers to weaponizing an agent, i.e., finding a suitable means of dissemination that will not destroy the 
agent’s virulence or infectivity. Even well-resourced state biological weapons programmes of the past faced critical challenges in over-
coming problems of aerosolisation and delivery of biological agents.
Other technologies, such as homemade explosives and small arms, are more accessible to terrorists than a sophisticated biological weap-
ons capability.
Jefferson, Lentzos & Marris
Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity: How Scared Should We Be?  60
References
China (2011). New scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention. Submissions from States Parties, Seventh Review 
Conference of the State Parties to the Convention of the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biologi-
cal) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.
Collett, M. S. (2006). "Impact of Synthetic Genomics on the Threat of Bioterrorism with Viral Agents." Working Papers for Synthetic Genomics: 
Risks and Benefits for Science and Society, pp. 83-103. M. S. Garfinkel, D. Endy, G. L. Epstein and R. M. Friedman (Eds.).
Drogin, B. (2005). Smallpox Exercise Poses Big Question: Is Anyone Ready? Los Angeles Times.
European Commission (2005). Synthetic Biology: Applying Engineering to Biology, Report of a NEST High-Level Expert Group. Brussels.
European Commission (2009). Ethics of Synthetic Biology. European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Com-
mission. Brussels.
Franz, D. and R. Zajtchuk (2002). "Biological Terrorism: Understanding the Threat, Preparation, and Medical Response." Disease-a-month 48: 
493-564.
Frist, B. (2005). A Manhattan Project for the 21st Century, prepared remarks delivered by Senator Bill Frist on June 1, 2005 at the Harvard 
Medical School Health Care Policy Seidman Lecture.
Garfinkel, M. S., D. Endy, G. L. Epstein and R. M. Friedman (2007). Synthetic Genomics: Options for Governance, J. Craig Venter Institute.
Jacoby, L. E. (2004). Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Statement by Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby for the 
Record, Senate Armed Services Committee: 1-23.
Maurer, S. M. and L. Zoloth (2007). "Synthesizing Biosecurity." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 63(6): 16-18.
Members of the NSABB (2012). "Adaptations of avian flu virus are a cause for concern." Science 335: 660-661.
Mukunda, G., K. A. Oye and S. C. Mohr (2009). "What rough beast? Synthetic biology, uncertainty, and the future of biosecurity." Politics and the 
Life Sciences 28(2): 2-26.
NSABB (2010). Addressing Biosecurity Concerns Related to Synthetic Biology, National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity.
Schmidt, M. (2008). "Diffusion of synthetic biology: a challenge to biosafety." Systems and Synthetic Biology 2: 1-6.
The Royal Academy of Engineering (2009). Synthetic Biology: scope, applications and implications. Royal Academy of Engineering, London.
Tucker, J. B. and R. A. Zilinskas (2006). "The Promise and Perils of Synthetic Biology." The New Atlantis (Spring): 25-45.
US National Intelligence Council (2004). Mapping the Global Future. Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project. Pittsburgh, PA.
Wheelis, M. (2004). "Will the 'new biology' lead to new weapons?" Arms Control Today 34(6).
Wilson Center (2013). Seven Myths and Realities about Do-It-Yourself Biology. Synthetic Biology Project. Washington, DC.
Wolinsky, H. (2009). "Kitchen Biology." EMBO reports 10(7): 683-685.
Zimmer, C. (2012). Amateurs are new fear in creating mutant virus. The New York Times.
Jefferson, Lentzos & Marris
Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity: How Scared Should We Be?  61
Jefferson, Lentzos & Marris
Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity: How Scared Should We Be?  62
